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INTRODUCTION 
Blackstone, a private equity group, sponsors various 
private equity funds, real estate funds and hedge funds.1  
When Blackstone sponsors a fund, outside investors such as 
pension plans, educational endowments, financial 
institutions, and wealthy individuals agree to invest money in 
the fund.2  Blackstone selects projects and securities in which 
the fund will invest, and, in exchange for its efforts, 
Blackstone receives a management fee plus a percentage of 
the profits earned by the fund (referred to as carried 
interest).3  In 2007, an entity named Blackstone Group LP 
began trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).4  
The Blackstone Group LP is an entity that is entitled to a 
percentage of the payments Blackstone receives by way of 
 
 1. For further discussion, see Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX 
L. REV. 89 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 97–98. 
 3. Id. at 94, 98. 
 4. See id. at 96–97. 
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management fees and carried interest from the various funds 
that it sponsors.5  Thus, anyone who buys an interest on the 
NYSE in Blackstone Group LP is entitled to share in what 
Blackstone receives as a fund sponsor. 
Blackstone Group LP is publicly traded; yet, unlike many 
publicly-traded companies, Blackstone Group LP is able to 
avoid being treated as a corporation for tax purposes.6  Thus, 
Blackstone Group LP is not required to pay corporate level 
tax on all of its income and saves massive amounts in tax.  
Blackstone Group LP benefits from this atypical tax 
treatment as a result of complex tax structuring that relies on 
many facets of tax law including the ability to electively 
determine the tax treatment of various entities owned by 
Blackstone Group LP.  This complex structuring illustrates, 
among other things, the ability of sophisticated taxpayers to 
use tax elections to obtain favorable tax treatment. 
Tax elections affect not only business entities but also 
individual taxpayers.  For example, if a divorced couple has a 
child and various requirements are met, one of the parents 
can claim the child as a dependent, and the parents electively 
decide which parent does so.7  Moreover, although 
sophisticated parties like Blackstone are able to save taxes by 
making favorable elections, many unsophisticated taxpayers 
who do not obtain adequate advice will fail to reap the 
potential tax savings resulting from a beneficial election.  In 
the context of the dependency exemption election, for 
instance, if a couple receives adequate advice, they can use 
the election to reduce their total tax liability by deciding that 
the parent who is subject to a higher tax rate will claim the 
exemption.8  By contrast, an unsophisticated couple who is 
unaware of the election may fail to obtain beneficial tax 
treatment.9 
Tax elections are prevalent.  In addition to the entity 
classification election upon which Blackstone relies and the 
dependency exemption election just discussed, examples 
include: elections by individual taxpayers to either claim the 
 
 5. Id. at 94, 98. 
 6. See id. at 97.  
 7. See infra Part I.C. 
 8. See infra Part I.C. 
 9. See infra Part I.C. 
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standard deduction or itemize deductions; an election that 
determines the tax treatment of alimony payments; and 
elections that affect the tax consequences of certain corporate 
transactions; just to name a few. 
In order to obtain more favorable tax consequences as a 
result of an election, a taxpayer can simply file a given 
election and need not alter any of the nontax aspects of his or 
her behavior or transactions.  Thus, a sophisticated, well-
advised taxpayer generally will have no reason to do anything 
other than make the most advantageous election possible.  
Consequently, only unsophisticated taxpayers who do not 
obtain adequate advice will forgo the potential tax benefits of 
an election.  As a result, tax elections produce unfairness.10 
Despite the unfairness they cause, tax elections remain.  
In some cases, the continued existence of an election can only 
be explained by the political influence of those who benefit 
from it.11  In other cases, scholars have identified benign 
justifications for an election.12  Ultimately, regardless of the 
reason for a particular election’s endurance, at least some 
elections are likely to continue to inhabit the tax landscape. 
Given the inevitability of at least some tax elections, this 
Article takes the approach of examining how elections can be 
designed to mitigate the resulting harms.  This Article 
focuses, in particular, on four features that can be designed to 
mitigate the unfairness caused by tax elections: (1) default 
rules; (2) alerting taxpayers to the presence of an election; (3) 
the deadline for filing an election; and (4) persistence.  
Default rules determine the tax consequences that follow 
when a taxpayer fails to make an election by the relevant 
 
 10. Tax elections are not the only examples of tax rules that are biased 
against unsophisticated individuals.  Other examples include opportunities to 
engage in tax planning by changing nontax features of a planned transaction.  
Like tax elections, these tax planning opportunities may disproportionately 
benefit sophisticated taxpayers.  For further discussion, see Emily Cauble, 
Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions: Does a Taxpayer Ever Deserve a Second 
Chance?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1013 (2012); Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: 
Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 22–24 (2010); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a 
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1319 (2001).  While 
many of the considerations discussed in this Article apply to this type of tax 
planning as well, this Article focuses on explicit tax elections. 
 11. See infra note 126. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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deadline.  Steps that could be taken to alert taxpayers to the 
presence of an election include providing further information 
on tax return forms and in tax return preparation software.  
An election’s deadline specifies the time by which a taxpayer 
must make an election.  An election’s persistence refers to the 
length of time during which any given election will affect tax 
consequences. 
A number of insightful articles about tax elections 
already exist.13  Some articles even discuss how to design 
features of elections, particularly default rules.14  This Article 
builds upon the existing literature in three important ways.  
First, before applying to tax law the analysis of default rules 
that has developed in contract law, this Article describes how 
the differences between tax law and contract law affect the 
examination of default rules.  Ultimately, the relevant 
differences between tax law and contract law relate to 
important timing differences between making tax elections 
and selecting contract provisions.  For example, one 
noteworthy difference between tax law and contract law is the 
time at which the government becomes involved.  At the time 
parties are establishing the terms of the contract, courts and 
other governmental bodies are not involved.  By contrast, in 
tax law, the government, in the capacity of providing 
information on tax return forms, is involved at the time the 
parties make tax election decisions, at least for elections that 
are filed at the same time as tax returns.  Thus, although in 
contract law it may be necessary or desirable to encourage 
one contracting party to provide his or her counterparty with 
 
 13. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” 42 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 451 (2009); Field, supra note 10; Heather M. Field, Tax Elections & 
Private Bargaining, 31 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2011); Aubree L. Helvey & Beth Stetson, 
The Doctrine of Election, 62 TAX LAW. 333 (2008); Victoria A. Levin, The 
Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Tax Law: Equity vs. Efficiency, 40 UCLA L. 
REV. 1587 (1993); John MacArthur Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson’s Choice 
and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1935); 
Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30 VA. 
TAX REV. 465 (2011); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer 
Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009); George K. 
Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions 
Stimulated by the “Check-the-Box” Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125 (1997); 
Edward Yorio, The Revocability of Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 
463 (1975). 
 14. See, e.g., Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13; 
Monroe, supra note 13, at 510–12; Raskolnikov, supra note 13, at 710–12. 
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information about legal rules, in tax law, the IRS could 
directly provide information to less informed taxpayers rather 
than rely on other taxpayers as the source of information 
about the law.  A second noteworthy timing difference is that 
contract terms are forward-looking while at least some tax 
elections are backward-looking.15  Contract terms govern the 
parties’ relationship going forward.16  Therefore, the parties 
design a contract term based on what they anticipate will 
occur after entering into a contract.17  Many tax elections, by 
contrast, are backward-looking.18  Such elections govern tax 
consequences for a year that has already closed before the 
election must be filed.  Thus, all information that determines 
whether the election is beneficial is available at the time the 
election is due.  Because of this timing distinction, in many 
cases, it will be difficult for a court to determine the 
contractual term the parties would have wanted at the time 
they entered into a contract but easy for courts or the IRS to 
determine what election a taxpayer would have wanted as of 
the due date for an election. 
Second, this Article imports into the discussion of tax 
election default rules a concept from contract law 
scholarship—the notion of tailored default rules versus 
untailored default rules—and uses this concept to make 
further recommendations regarding tax election default 
rules.19  A tailored default rule aims to exactly match what 
the particular contracting parties would have wanted had 
they considered a specific term, while an untailored default 
rule might not match what any particular set of contracting 
parties would have selected but rather represents what the 
majority of contracting parties would desire.20  In contract 
law, a tailored default rule is typically a vague, flexible 
standard under which courts supply a term that would be 
reasonable given the surrounding facts and circumstances.21  
By contrast, an untailored default rule is usually a more 
certain rule that represents what the majority of parties 
 
 15. See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion.  
 16. See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion. 
 17. See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion. 
 18. See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion. 
 19. See infra Part IV.A.2.iii for further discussion. 
 20. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 21. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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might prefer but that, given its inflexible nature, does not 
necessarily represent what any particular set of contracting 
parties might have chosen.22  In contract law, the main 
disadvantage of tailored default rules is the difficulty of 
applying them given their vague nature.  However, because of 
the features that distinguish tax elections from contract law, 
tailored default rules are often easy to apply in the tax 
election context and can, in some cases, be quite useful. 
Third, this Article explores how the interaction among 
the various features of tax elections can simplify the task of 
designing rules to protect unsophisticated taxpayers.  For 
example, although taxpayer-favorable default rules can 
protect unsophisticated taxpayers, in some cases, it may be 
difficult to select a default rule that will be favorable for all 
taxpayers.  Nevertheless, in such a case, tax election 
parameters can protect unsophisticated taxpayers because 
later filing deadlines could allow more unsophisticated 
taxpayers to make informed decisions with respect to the 
election. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces and 
discusses five elections used as examples throughout the 
Article.  Part II explains why elections are problematic, and 
Part III discusses why elections continue to exist despite their 
many flaws.  Finally, Part IV explores how the features of 
elections should be designed to mitigate the resulting harms. 
I. EXAMPLES OF TAX ELECTIONS 
Hundreds of elections exist under current tax law in 
areas including individual income tax,23 partnership tax,24 
corporate tax,25 international tax,26 and estate tax.27  Tax 
elections vary in a number of ways, two of which are 
 
 22. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 23. Examples include several of the elections discussed in this paper.  See 
infra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C. 
 24. Examples include the elections available under §§ 704(c), 754 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  I.R.C. §§ 704(c), 754 (2012).  
 25. An example is the election in § 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue 
Code discussed below.  See infra Part I.E. 
 26. Examples include the election to either deduct foreign taxes or take a 
foreign tax credit.  See I.R.C. §§ 901(a), 164(a). 
 27. An example is the election to pay estate taxes in installments.  See id.  
§ 6166. 
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significant for purposes of the recommendations made in this 
Article.  First, some tax elections are backward-looking, while 
others are forward looking.  Backward-looking tax elections 
govern tax consequences for a year that has already closed 
before the election must be filed.  Thus, all information that 
determines whether the election is beneficial is available at 
the time the election is due.  By contrast, forward-looking 
elections continue to affect tax consequences in the future and 
do not merely affect tax consequences for a year that has 
already closed.  Thus, at the time a taxpayer must make a 
forward-looking election, he or she will not possess all 
information relevant to assessing the pros and cons of making 
the election.  Second, tax elections vary because some tax 
elections affect taxpayers whose interests are aligned, while 
other tax elections affect taxpayers with divergent interests. 
This part of the Article describes five elections that will 
be used to illustrate recommendations made in later parts of 
the Article.  First, this part describes a backward-looking 
election that affects taxpayers whose interests are aligned, 
namely, the election by an individual taxpayer to either claim 
the standard deduction or itemize deductions.  Next, this part 
describes two backward-looking elections that affect 
taxpayers with divergent interests, namely, an election that 
determines the tax treatment of alimony payments and an 
election by divorced parents to determine which parent 
claims a child as a dependent.28  The fourth election described 
in this part, the entity classification election, is a forward-
looking election that affects taxpayers whose interests are 
aligned.29  The final election described, the election under  
§ 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code that affects the 
tax consequences of certain contributions made to 
corporations, is a forward-looking election that can affect 
taxpayers whose interests diverge. 
 
 28. Professor Field provides the second and third examples as illustrations 
for discussing the design of tax elections as well.  See Field, Tax Elections & 
Private Bargaining, supra note 13.  I describe them here because of their 
usefulness for illustrating the recommendations made later in this Article. 
 29. For a discussion of why the interests of the taxpayers are aligned, see 
infra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Standard Deduction vs. Itemizing Deductions 
Every year, individual taxpayers choose between 
claiming the standard deduction and itemizing deductions.  If 
an individual claims the standard deduction then, when 
calculating his or her taxable income, that individual will 
subtract the relevant standard deduction amount and 
personal exemption amount from the individual’s adjusted 
gross income (AGI).30  The standard deduction is a specific 
dollar amount, adjusted annually for inflation.31  For 2012, 
the standard deduction was $5950 for a single taxpayer and 
$11,900 for married individuals filing joint returns.32  If a 
taxpayer elects to itemize deductions then, in lieu of claiming 
the standard deduction, that taxpayer will subtract from AGI 
the dollar amount of certain expenses actually incurred by 
the taxpayer, subject to certain limitations.33 
Absent an election to itemize deductions, a taxpayer is 
entitled to the standard deduction by default.34  Whether this 
default rule is favorable depends on the amount of actual, 
itemizable expenses incurred by the taxpayer.  However, the 
default rule is of limited importance because taxpayers are 
given ample time and opportunity to elect out of the default 
rule.  If a taxpayer files a completed return, he or she will be 
forced to make an affirmative choice because the taxpayer 
will report a dollar amount on the relevant line of the return 
equal to either the standard deduction amount or the total 
amount of itemizable expenses.35  Moreover, the return form 
 
 30. AGI is, in turn, calculated by subtracting from a taxpayer’s gross income 
various expenses such as certain trade or business expenses, alimony (unless, as 
described infra Part I.B, the individual does not deduct alimony), and other 
expenses listed in § 62 of the Internal Revenue Code.  See I.R.C. § 62. 
 31. I.R.C. § 63(c)(4). 
 32. Rev. Proc. 2011-52 § 3.11(1), 2011-45 I.R.B. 701.  The standard 
deduction is also subject to certain other adjustments.  For example, it is 
increased for aged and blind taxpayers.  I.R.C. §§ 63(c)(1)(B), (c)(3), (f). 
 33. I.R.C. § 63.  Certain expenses, such as medical expenses and the 
charitable contribution deduction, are subject to item-specific limitations.  See 
id. §§ 213, 170.  Furthermore, certain items are deductible only to the extent 
that the aggregate of those items exceeds two percent of the taxpayer’s AGI.  Id. 
§ 67.  In addition, except for certain items like medical expenses, when a 
taxpayer’s AGI exceeds a given threshold, allowable itemized deductions will be 
phased out.  Id. § 68. 
 34. Id. § 63(b). 
 35. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 
FORM 1040 at line 40 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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itself alerts taxpayers to the fact that a choice is being 
made,36 and the instructions accompanying the form provide 
advice to guide taxpayers in making the selection.37 
The standard deduction default rule is significant only if 
a taxpayer fails to file a completed return, and the IRS 
prepares and files a substitute return based on information 
available to the IRS (such as information provided by 
employers and other third parties).38  This substitute return 
would calculate taxable income based on the standard 
deduction.39  However, even in this instance, only a persistent 
failure to act would preclude the taxpayer from itemizing 
deductions.  When the taxpayer receives notice of the 
substitute return, the taxpayer can file his or her own return 
on which he or she can itemize deductions.  The return filed 
by the taxpayer would be treated as a request for audit 
reconsideration and would replace the substitute return if 
accepted by the IRS.40 
Regarding deadlines, the election must be made on a 
taxpayer’s return filed for the relevant year—therefore, the 
election is due when the tax return is due.41  The advantages 
and disadvantages of itemizing deductions depend only on the 
expenses incurred by the taxpayer and income earned by the 
taxpayer in a year that will have closed before the election 
must be made.  Thus, at the time the taxpayer makes the 
election, he or she will possess all information relevant to 
 
pdf/f1040.pdf. 
 36. Form 1040, line 40, states that a taxpayer should provide: “Itemized 
deduction (from Schedule A) or your standard deduction (see left margin).”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted).  The left margin then lists the relevant dollar amounts for 
the standard deduction, and Schedule A and its instructions walk the taxpayer 
through the process for calculating itemized deductions.  See id. 
 37. Instructions to Form 1040 state the following regarding line 40: “In most 
cases, your federal income tax will be less if you take the larger of your itemized 
deduction or standard deductions.”  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 1040 at 37–38 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i1040gi.pdf.   The instructions then refer the taxpayer to Schedule A for 
guidance regarding calculating itemized deductions and continue by describing 
how the taxpayer can determine the standard deduction amount.  See id. at 38. 
 38. I.R.C. § 6020(b) (providing IRS with authority to prepare substitute 
returns). 
 39. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRM 4.10.4.3 (Aug. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-010-004.html#d0e470. 
 40. See IINTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRM 4.13.1.7(1)(B) (Oct. 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-013-001.html#d0e166. 
 41. I.R.C. § 63(e)(2). 
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assessing its effects.  Furthermore, the taxpayer may change 
the election on an amended tax return filed within the period 
of the statute of limitations for claiming a tax refund.42 
Finally, regarding persistence, the election only affects 
the tax results of the year that has already closed.  The 
taxpayer may make a different decision for any future year. 
Overall the parameters of the election are quite generous.  
Taxpayers are given substantial time to make and revise the 
election.  Tax return forms provide information regarding the 
pros and cons of making the election, and taxpayers are 
entitled to make a new election every year.43  These taxpayer-
favorable parameters likely reflect the understanding that 
many unsophisticated taxpayers must choose between 
claiming the standard deduction and itemizing deductions.44  
Also, the parameters may emanate from the fact that one 
purpose of the election is to allow taxpayers to avoid the chore 
of keeping track of itemized deductions.45  To not undermine 
this goal of promoting simplicity, the process for making the 
election should, itself, be simple. 
B. Alimony 
Another election relevant to some individual taxpayers 
affects the treatment of alimony.  By default, alimony 
payments are included in the income of the spouse receiving 
alimony46 and deducted by the spouse paying alimony.47  
However, if both spouses agree, in lieu of following the default 
treatment, the recipient will exclude the payments from 
income, and the payor will not deduct the payments.48 
In the typical case, the default rule is favorable to 
taxpayers.  The default rule is advantageous if the spouse 
 
 42. Id. § 63(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.63-1 (2012); I.R.C. § 6511. 
 43. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Patricia A. Jendraszek, Comment, An Analysis of the Status of 
Amended Tax Returns and the Effects of their Use, 23 HOUS. L. REV. 769, 797 
(1986). 
 45. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 46. I.R.C. § 71(a). 
 47. Id. § 215(a). 
 48. Id. § 71(b)(1)(B).  Some aspects of the tax treatment of payments in 
divorce depend on implicit tax planning rather than explicit tax elections.  For 
further discussion, see, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing 
the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAX LAW. 
363 (2002). 
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paying alimony is in a higher tax bracket than the spouse 
receiving alimony, which is often true because the spouse 
paying alimony usually earns more income than the spouse 
receiving alimony.  In order to demonstrate, assume the 
payor is subject to a thirty-five percent tax rate, the recipient 
is subject to a twenty-five percent tax rate, and the amount of 
alimony paid is $50,000.  By deducting alimony, the payor 
incurs tax liability that is $17,500 lower than the liability he 
or she would have incurred absent the deduction.  At the 
same time, by including the payment in income, the recipient 
becomes subject to tax liability that is $12,500 higher than 
the liability to which he or she would have been subject 
without this income.49  Thus, the aggregate tax liability of the 
parties under the default rule is $5000 lower than the 
aggregate tax liability that would have resulted had the 
parties elected out of the default rule.  Moreover, both 
spouses could share in this aggregate benefit if the spouse 
paying alimony increases the amount paid in order to shift 
some of the benefit of the tax deduction to the spouse 
receiving alimony.50  If the spouse receiving alimony was 
subject to a higher tax rate than the paying spouse, the 
 
 49. For simplicity, these calculations assume that including the payment in 
income  (or deducting the payment) is not sufficient to move the paying spouse 
or receiving spouse into a different marginal tax bracket. 
 50. See Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 10–11.  
For example, assume the paying spouse is subject to a thirty-five percent tax 
rate, the receiving spouse is subject to a twenty-five percent tax rate, and the 
parties would have agreed to alimony payments of $50,000 if they opted out of 
the default treatment.  Retaining the default treatment and increasing the 
amount of the payment to $70,000 can improve the economic position of both 
individuals.  If the payment was $50,000 and the parties opted out of the 
default treatment, the paying spouse would incur a $50,000 after-tax loss (he or 
she pays $50,000 and is not entitled to a deduction).  The receiving spouse 
would achieve a $50,000 after-tax gain (he or she receives $50,000 and is not 
subject to tax on the payment).  If the payment is increased to $70,000 and the 
parties do not opt out of default treatment, the paying spouse would incur a 
$45,500 after-tax loss ($50,000 pre-tax payment minus $24,500 tax savings 
resulting from deducting the payment from income taxed at thirty-five percent).  
Thus, the paying spouse’s economic position is improved by $4500.  The 
receiving spouse would achieve a $52,500 after-tax gain ($70,000 payment 
minus $17,500 tax liability incurred as a result of taxing the payment at 
twenty-five percent).  Thus, the receiving spouse’s economic position is improved 
by $2500.  For simplicity, these calculations assume that including the payment 
in income (or deducting the payment) is not sufficient to move the paying spouse 
or receiving spouse into a different marginal tax bracket. 
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parties would benefit from making the election so that 
alimony was excluded from the income of the recipient and 
not deducted by the payor. 
The parties make the election by designating the 
payment as not includible in gross income and not allowable 
as a deduction in the “divorce or separation instrument.”51  
The divorce or separation instrument can include any writing 
signed by both parties that refers to their written separation 
agreement.52  A copy of this signed writing must be attached 
to the recipient’s first filed tax return for each year in which 
the election out of default treatment applies.53  Because the 
election can be made in a writing attached to the recipient’s 
return, the parties can decide whether to make the election 
each year after the year is closed.  At that time, the parties 
will have all the information required to determine whether 
the election is advantageous. 
Regarding persistence, the parties can change the 
election every year.54  Thus, if the relative circumstances of 
the parties change so that a different party is in a higher tax 
bracket in any given year, the parties can change the election 
to achieve more favorable tax consequences. 
C. Divorced Parents and the Dependency Exemption 
Another election relevant to divorced couples determines 
which parent takes a dependency exemption for a child.  If a 
divorced couple has a child and various requirements are met, 
then one of the parents can claim the child as a dependent, 
and the parents electively decide which parent does so.55 
Regarding the default rule, if no election is made to the 
contrary, the “custodial parent” takes the exemption.56  The 
 
 51. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B). 
 52. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b) Q&A-8 (2011). 
 53. Id.  Attaching the agreement to an amended return would not be 
effective.  See CINDY L. WOFFORD, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., TAX 
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO: DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, 515-2ND, at II.D.8. 
 54. Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 10 (citing 
WOFFORD, supra note 53). 
 55. For either of the parents to claim the child as a dependent for a given 
year, for example, the child must not have provided over one-half of his or her 
own support for that year, and, unless the child is disabled, he or she must be 
younger than nineteen (or a student younger than twenty-four).  See I.R.C.  
§ 152(c)(1)(C)–(D). 
 56. Id. § 152(c)(1)(B), (c)(4)(B)(i). 
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custodial parent is the parent who has custody of the child for 
the greater portion of the calendar year.57  The parties can 
affirmatively elect for the noncustodial parent to take the 
exemption instead.58  To make this election for any given 
year, the custodial parent must sign a written declaration 
stating that he or she will not claim the child as a dependent 
for that year, and the noncustodial parent must attach this 
declaration to his or her return for that year.59  The default 
rule will be favorable if the custodial parent is subject to a 
higher tax rate than the noncustodial parent, but, when the 
reverse is true, the default rule is unfavorable.60  It is unclear 
whether the default rule is more commonly favorable or 
unfavorable because a parent may have custody for any 
number of reasons that do not necessarily bear any relation to 
that parent’s income (and thus marginal tax bracket).61 
Regarding its deadline, the election must be filed by the 
due date for the noncustodial parent’s tax return.62  By the 
time the election is due, all relevant information will be 
available because the benefits of the election depend on the 
taxpayers’ income for the year that will have already closed 
before the election must be filed.  Finally, regarding 
persistence, the election only needs to affect the year that is 
already closed because a different election may be made each 
year.63 
 
 57. Id. §152(e)(4)(A). 
 58. Id. § 152(e). 
 59. Id. § 152(e)(2). 
 60. In some cases, other factors affect the analysis, such as the phase-out of 
the exemption at high income levels.  See Field, Tax Elections & Private 
Bargaining, supra note 13, at 12. 
 61. See id. at 65–66. 
 62. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2).  If taxpayers later discover that a different election 
would have been more favorable, it is likely that they cannot change the election 
merely by amending their tax returns.  Occasionally, a statute expressly allows 
a taxpayer to change an election in an amended return.  This is true, for 
instance, regarding the election between taking the standard deduction and 
itemizing deductions.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  If a statute 
does not explicitly grant this right, taxpayers generally cannot change elections 
in amended returns unless: (i) the amended return is filed before the due date 
for the original return, (ii) the election is consistent with how the taxpayer 
reported items on the original return, or (iii) the election made on the original 
return was improper.  See Jendraszek, supra note 44, at 796–98. 
 63. The written declaration signed by the custodial parent may release the 
exemption for only a single year or for more than one (or all) future years.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(e)(1) (2012).  If the custodial parent releases the 
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D. The Entity Classification Election 
Turning from the world of individual taxpayers to the 
business arena, one election available to many business 
entities determines how those entities are classified for tax 
purposes.  While certain business entities must be treated as 
corporations for tax purposes,64 under the check-the-box 
regulations, many business entities are allowed to elect their 
tax classification.65  If a business entity has two or more 
owners and is allowed to elect its classification, it may elect to 
be treated as either a partnership or a corporation for tax 
purposes.66  If a business entity has one owner and is allowed 
to elect its classification, it may elect to be treated as either a 
disregarded entity or a corporation for tax purposes.67 
An entity’s classification significantly affects the tax 
treatment of the entity and its owners.68  If an entity is 
treated as a corporation for tax purposes, generally the entity 
will be subject to entity-level tax.69  In addition, tax losses 
recognized by the entity may be used to reduce its own 
taxable income but cannot be taken into account directly by 
the entity’s owners.70  Furthermore, owners of the entity may 
be subject to tax when they sell ownership interests in the 
 
exemption for more than the current year, the custodial parent may revoke the 
release by providing the noncustodial parent with written notice.  Such a 
revocation would be effective no earlier than the year after the year in which 
the custodial parent provides written notice or makes reasonable efforts to 
provide written notice.  Id. § 1.152-4(e)(3).  However, presumably the revocation 
could be effective earlier if the noncustodial parent agrees. 
 64. Certain entities (per se corporations) are automatically treated as 
corporations for U.S. tax purposes.  See id. § 301.7701-2(b).  Such entities 
include, among others, (i) entities that are organized under a Federal or State 
statute that describes or refers to the entity as incorporated or as a corporation, 
and (ii) publicly-traded partnerships that do not earn predominately qualifying 
income.  See id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), (b)(7); I.R.C. § 7704.  Per se corporations are 
not allowed to elect to be treated as pass-through entities.  See Treas. Reg.  
§ 301.7701-3(a) (providing that only eligible entities—or entities that are not 
per se corporations—can elect their tax classification). 
 65. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. For a more complete discussion of the effects of entity classification, see 
generally WILLIAM P. STRENG, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., TAX 
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO: CHOICE OF ENTITY, 700-3RD, II–XIV. 
 69. I.R.C. § 11(b). 
 70. Id. 
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entity or receive certain distributions from the entity.71  If an 
entity is treated as a partnership for tax purposes or is 
disregarded as separate from its owner for tax purposes, the 
entity will not be subject to tax.  Instead, any items of tax 
income, gain, loss or deduction recognized by the entity will 
be passed through to the entity’s owner(s) for the owner(s) to 
take into account directly when computing their own taxable 
income.72  Thus, treatment as a corporation generally involves 
two levels of tax, in particular both an entity-level tax and an 
owner-level tax.73  By contrast, treatment as a partnership or 
a disregarded entity (referred to collectively as pass-through 
entities) involves only one level of tax, the tax imposed at the 
owner level.74  Consequently, classification as a pass-through 
entity typically involves a lesser tax burden than 
classification as a corporation.  However, corporate tax 
treatment is more favorable in some cases.75 
If an entity is formed in the United States and is eligible 
to elect its tax treatment, the entity will receive pass-through 
treatment unless an election is filed to treat the entity as a 
corporation.76  This pass-through default rule is typically, but 
not always, favorable.77 
Regarding its deadline, an entity classification election 
must be filed no later than seventy-five days after the desired 
effective date for the election (which, in many cases, means 
seventy-five days after the entity is formed).78  However, in 
 
 71. Id. §§ 301, 1001 (regarding distributions and gain from sale of 
ownership interests, respectively). 
 72. Id. § 701. 
 73. See id. § 11(b). 
 74. See id. § 701. 
 75. For an example of a situation in which treatment as a corporation would 
be more favorable, see infra note 88 and accompanying text.  In addition, in 
some cases, treatment as an S Corporation could be more favorable than 
treatment as a partnership, and an entity will not be treated as an S 
Corporation absent an affirmative election to be treated as an S Corporation. 
 76. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (2012).  The default rules for non-U.S. 
entities are different.  Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2). 
 77. See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
 78. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iii) (providing that the election can be 
effective no earlier than seventy-five days before it is filed).  This often means 
that the election must be filed within seventy-five days of an entity’s formation 
because changes to an existing entity’s classification could have negative tax 
consequences in some cases.  For example, see infra note 100 and accompanying 
text. 
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some cases, relief may be granted to file the election late.  In 
particular, if the entity requests relief for a late election 
within three years and seventy-five days of the desired 
effective date, the IRS will automatically grant relief if: (1) 
the entity failed to obtain its preferred classification solely 
because the relevant form was not filed in a timely manner, 
(2) the entity either has not yet filed a tax return or has filed 
returns consistent with its preferred classification, and (3) the 
entity has reasonable cause for its failure to timely file the 
election.79 
Because of these three requirements, a taxpayer’s 
prospects for obtaining relief will be fairly bleak unless, prior 
to the original seventy-five day deadline, the taxpayer had 
decided upon the classification that the taxpayer now seeks 
and failed to file the election merely as a result of a minor 
error, such as a miscommunication regarding who would file 
the election.80  A taxpayer who failed to even consider the 
availability of the election is unlikely to obtain relief to file a 
late election.81  Also, a taxpayer will be precluded from filing a 
late election if he or she decided to treat the entity one way 
and now seeks to file an election to treat it differently in order 
to benefit from hindsight.82  In other words, the taxpayer may 
not file a late election because unanticipated economic results 
of the underlying business or other information that has come 
to the taxpayer’s attention since the original seventy-five day 
deadline make the alternate classification more favorable.  If 
the taxpayer is not entitled to automatic relief for filing a late 
election, the taxpayer must request a private letter ruling to 
 
 79. See Rev. Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 I.R.B. 4.01 (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2009-39_IRB/ar17.html#d0e6036. 
 80. Courts are most likely to grant relief for late filing of elections under 
these facts, which suggests that reasonable cause should be interpreted to refer 
to situations involving minor error or similar facts.  For a discussion of when 
courts grant relief, see MICHAEL B. LANG & COLLEEN A. KHOURY, FEDERAL TAX 
ELECTIONS ¶ 2.02 (1991); Yorio, supra note 13, at 475–76. 
 81. A taxpayer who failed to consider the election likely does not have 
reasonable cause for its failure to file, based on when courts grant relief for late 
filing.  For a discussion of when courts grant relief, see LANG & KHOURY, supra 
note 80, ¶ 2.02[3] ; Yorio, supra note 13, at 476–78. 
 82. A taxpayer who is attempting to benefit from hindsight likely does not 
have reasonable cause for its failure to file, based on when courts grant relief for 
late filing.  For a discussion of when courts grant relief, see LANG & KHOURY, 
supra note 80, ¶ 2.02[3]; Yorio, supra note 13, at  478. 
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obtain relief.83  Requesting a private letter ruling is a costly 
proposition.84  In addition, restrictions on the ability to obtain 
a private letter ruling are similar to the limitations placed on 
automatic extensions of time.85 
In some cases, whether pass-through treatment is 
favorable depends on the economic results achieved by the 
business, which will be unknown before the due date for filing 
an election.  Therefore, taxpayers may have to make an entity 
classification decision before all relevant information is 
available.  In other words, unlike the backward-looking tax 
elections in the individual taxpayer context discussed 
previously,86 the entity classification election is a forward-
looking election.  As a result, taxpayers may make entity 
classification decisions that seem favorable but prove to be 
unfavorable in retrospect. 
For example, assume a group of tax-exempt entities (such 
as private employer-sponsored pension plans, educational 
endowments, and private foundations) plan to invest in a real 
estate fund that intends to buy and sell for-sale housing (such 
as condominiums) in non-U.S. countries that tax income at a 
rate lower than the U.S. corporate tax rate.  If the tax-exempt 
entities owned interests in an entity treated as a partnership 
for U.S. tax purposes and that entity, in turn, owned the for-
sale housing, the tax-exempt entities generally would bear a 
combined U.S. and non-U.S. effective tax rate equivalent to 
the U.S. corporate tax rate on gains recognized from the for-
 
 83. See Rev. Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 I.R.B. 4.01 (2009); Treas. Reg.  
§ 301.9100-3(e)(5).  A private letter ruling is written guidance issued by the IRS 
to a particular taxpayer. 
 84. See Helvey & Stetson, supra note 13, at 355 (stating that the minimum 
filing fee is $625 along with the fees for hiring a tax professional). 
 85. For instance, the IRS will deny a taxpayer a favorable letter ruling if the 
taxpayer decided to treat the entity one way and now seeks a ruling in order to 
file an election to treat it differently to benefit from hindsight.  Treas. Reg.  
§ 301.9100-3(b)(3)(iii).  Also, a taxpayer who failed to seek advice about an 
election prior to the seventy-five day deadline is unlikely to obtain a favorable 
letter ruling.  This is true because, in order to obtain relief, the taxpayer must 
have acted reasonably and in good faith.  Id. § 301.9100-3(a).  The regulations 
list several circumstances in which a taxpayer is generally deemed to have so 
acted.  See id. § 301.9100-3(b)(1).  None of the circumstances seem to 
contemplate a situation in which the taxpayer obtained no information about 
the election prior to the original filing deadline. 
 86. See supra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C. 
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sale housing.87  If the tax-exempt entities, instead, invested in 
a non-U.S. entity treated as a corporation for U.S. tax 
purposes and that entity owned the for-sale housing, the tax-
exempt entities generally would bear an effective tax rate 
equal to the non-U.S. tax rate (assumed to be lower than the 
U.S. corporate tax rate, as stated above).88  Consequently, 
 
 87. Tax-exempt entities are generally not subject to U.S. tax.  However, 
under the unrelated business income tax (UBIT), tax-exempt entities are 
subject to U.S. tax on income earned from certain activities and investments.  
See I.R.C. §§ 501, 511–14 (2012).  The UBIT requires that a tax-exempt pay tax 
at regular corporate rates (or at rates generally applicable to taxable trusts in 
the case of tax-exempt entities that are trusts) on income derived from a trade 
or business regularly carried on by the tax-exempt and not substantially related 
to its exempt purpose.  See id. §§ 511–13.  The activities of a partnership are 
attributed to its partners for purposes of determining whether a tax-exempt 
partner realizes income subject to the UBIT as a result of an investment in a 
partnership.  Therefore, if a partnership engages in an activity that would be an 
unrelated trade or business if a tax-exempt partner engaged in the activity 
directly, income allocated to the tax-exempt partner by the partnership with 
respect to such activity will be subject to the UBIT.  Id. § 512(c)(1).  
Consequently, when a partnership sells for-sale housing, gain from the for-sale 
housing allocated to a tax-exempt partner is subject to the UBIT because the 
tax-exempt partner would recognize income subject to the UBIT if it bought and 
sold for-sale housing directly, assuming it was not substantially related to its 
exempt purpose.  If a tax-exempt entity subject to thirty-five percent UBIT (the 
corporate rate) invests in a partnership that sells for-sale housing in a non-U.S. 
country with a tax rate of twenty-eight percent and the housing generates a 
gain of which the tax-exempt entity’s share is $100, the tax-exempt entity will 
bear a total tax burden of thirty-five dollars.  The tax-exempt entity’s share of 
non-U.S. tax is twenty-eight dollars, and the tax-exempt entity’s share of U.S. 
tax is seven dollars (thirty-five dollars of UBIT minus twenty-eight dollars of 
foreign tax credits).  Thus, the total effective tax rate is thirty-five percent (the 
corporate rate). 
 88. Certain types of income are generally not subject to the UBIT.  Id. 
 § 512(b).  Such income includes dividends and capital gain income.  Id.  Special 
rules apply if the income is debt-financed.  Id. § 514.  If the tax-exempt entities 
hold interests in an entity treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, the 
income they earn from the entity will consist of dividends and capital gain 
income, generally not subject to the UBIT as long as the tax-exempt entities’ 
interests in the corporation are not debt-financed.  Furthermore, because the 
income earned by the non-U.S. corporation (gain from sale of non-U.S. real 
estate) is generally not subject to U.S. tax when earned by a non-U.S. person 
such as a non-U.S. corporation, the non-U.S. corporation will not be subject to 
corporate-level U.S. tax.  As a result, the only tax burden borne by the tax-
exempt entities will be their share of non-U.S. tax imposed by the country in 
which the real estate is located.  Thus, assuming the non-U.S. tax rate is lower 
than the UBIT rate, the tax-exempt entities bear a lower tax burden as a result 
of investing through a non-U.S. corporation than as a result of investing 
through a partnership.  For further discussion of structuring opportunities and 
real estate funds, see Richard M. Nugent, Possible Approaches for Avoiding 
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assuming the parties anticipate that the for-sale housing will 
be sold at a gain, the tax-exempt entities will expect to benefit 
from more favorable tax consequences if they invest through 
a non-U.S. entity treated as a corporation for U.S. tax 
purposes.  Thus, assuming the tax-exempt entities invest 
through a non-U.S. entity that is treated as a partnership for 
U.S. tax purposes by default,89 the tax-exempt entities will 
file an election to treat the entity as a corporation effective as 
of the date of formation. 
Suppose that, after the for-sale housing projects are 
completed and sold, the tax-exempt entities learn that the 
housing projects, contrary to their expectations, generated 
economic and tax losses.  As a result, the tax-exempt entities 
would have realized more favorable tax consequences if the 
non-U.S. entity that held the housing projects had been 
treated as a partnership, rather than a corporation, for U.S. 
tax purposes.90  Thus, if they were able to do so, the parties 
would file an amended election to treat the entity as a 
partnership, effective retroactively as of a date before the 
underlying assets accrued losses.  However, existing law 
precludes the parties from filing such an election because it 
would represent an attempt to benefit from hindsight.91 
Regarding the persistence of the election, absent a 
significant change in ownership of the entity,92 classification 
 
UBTI on Real Estate Investments, 97 TAX NOTES 271 (2002). 
 89. If it has two or more members and at least one member does not have 
limited liability, a non-U.S. entity that is eligible to elect its classification will 
be treated as a partnership by default.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(A).  Thus, 
assuming that the tax-exempt entities invest in a non-U.S. entity in which one 
owner has unlimited liability, such as the foreign equivalent of a limited 
partnership, the entity will be treated as a partnership unless an election is 
filed to treat it as a corporation. 
 90. If the entity had been treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes, 
when it sold the housing projects, each tax-exempt partner would be allocated 
its share of unrelated business losses resulting from the sale.  Each tax-exempt 
partner could deduct the resulting losses against other unrelated business 
taxable income, subject to certain limitations.  I.R.C. § 512(a)(1); Treas. Reg.  
§ 1.512(a)-1(a).  By contrast, if the entity is treated as a corporation for U.S. tax 
purposes, losses that it recognizes will not flow through to the tax-exempt 
entities. 
 91. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 92. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (If more than fifty percent of the 
interests in the entity change hands, an earlier elective change in classification 
is possible). 
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elections can only be changed every five years.93  However, if 
an entity is initially classified by default, there is no limit on 
how soon it could make a first change to its classification.94  
Also, if an entity files an election that is effective as of the 
date the entity was formed (an initial classification election), 
there is no restriction on how soon the entity could elect to 
make a first change to its classification.95 
Even if the five-year rule prevents an entity from making 
an explicit election to change its classification, the entity 
could carry out a transaction that likely achieves the same 
result.96  Assume, for example, a U.S. entity with two owners 
files an election to be classified as a corporation effective one 
day after the date of formation.  This entity would not be 
allowed to file an election to be treated as a partnership 
effective earlier than five years and one day after the entity’s 
formation.  However, before that date, this entity could 
distribute all of its assets to its owners in liquidation, and the 
owners could, in turn, contribute the assets to a newly formed 
entity treated as a partnership for tax purposes.97 
Finally, any change, elective or otherwise, will affect an 
entity’s classification prospectively but not retroactively 
(except that, in the case of an elective change, the effective 
date could be up to seventy-five days before the election is 
filed).  As noted above, whether any classification decision 
will prove to be favorable may depend, at least in part, on the 
economic results of the underlying business that are 
unknown at the time the decision is made.  Furthermore, 
because any change in classification will be largely 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  The five-year limitation only applies if an entity makes an election, 
thus classification by default would not trigger the five-year limitation.  Id. 
 95. Id.  “An election by a newly formed eligible entity that is effective on the 
date of formation” does not trigger the five-year limitation.  Id. 
 96. Professor Field also makes this observation.  See Field, Checking in on 
“Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at n.287. 
 97. These transactions could effectively mimic the results of an elective 
change to the entity’s classification because, under the Treasury Regulations, 
when an existing corporation elects to be treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes, the following transactions are deemed to occur: (i) the corporation 
distributes all of its assets to its shareholders in liquidation, and (ii) the 
shareholders contribute all of the assets to a newly formed partnership.  Treas. 
Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii).  Thus, this strategy could be effective unless the IRS 
successfully argues that the new entity should be treated as a mere 
continuation of the old entity for tax purposes. 
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prospective, the flexibility to change the entity’s classification 
upon discovering unexpected economic results will not 
necessarily save the taxpayers from having made an election 
that proves to be unfavorable.  For instance, in the example 
discussed above,98 when the tax-exempt entities discover that 
the real estate fund’s assets have fallen in value, they might 
file an election to change the real estate fund’s classification 
to partnership.  The five-year rule would not prevent such a 
change given that the earlier election to treat the fund as a 
corporation was an initial classification election that does not 
trigger the five-year limitation.99  However, filing a change of 
election does not save the tax-exempt entities from the 
unexpectedly negative tax consequences.  This is the case 
because the negative tax consequences will still occur as a 
result of the fact that the fund was treated as a corporation 
from the date of formation until the effective date of this later 
elective change in classification.100 
E. The § 362(e)(2)(C) Election 
Section 362(e)(2)(C) contains another election relevant in 
the business context: when a shareholder, or group of 
shareholders, contributes property to a corporation in 
exchange for stock, the shareholder(s) will not recognize the 
gain or loss built into the property as long as the contributing 
shareholder(s) own a controlling interest in the corporation 
immediately after the contribution.101  To ensure that any 
built-in gain or loss is recognized at the time of a future 
transaction, the built-in gain or loss will be preserved. 
 
 
 98. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 100. If the election is effective after losses have accrued, the losses will be 
recognized by the corporation as a result of a deemed liquidation of the 
corporation and, therefore, the losses will not flow through to the tax-exempt 
entities.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii) (providing that, as a result of the 
elective change, the corporation will be deemed to distribute all of its assets to 
the shareholders in liquidation and the shareholders will be deemed to 
contribute all the assets to a newly formed partnership); I.R.C. § 336(a) (2012) 
(providing that a corporation will generally recognize losses as a result of a 
liquidation, so that the corporation would recognize the built-in losses at the 
time of the deemed liquidation resulting from the elective change in 
classification). 
 101. I.R.C. § 351. 
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For example, assume an individual acquires a parcel of 
land for $100.  Over time, the value of the land decreases to 
seventy-five dollars.  The individual contributes the land to a 
newly formed corporation in exchange for all of the 
corporation’s stock.  The individual will not recognize any tax 
loss as a result of this exchange.102  Under law that existed 
prior to 2004, the individual’s basis in the stock received 
would be $100 (the same as the individual’s basis in the 
land),103 and the corporation’s basis in the land would be $100 
(the same as the individual’s basis in the land).104  Thus, if the 
individual were to sell the stock for seventy-five dollars, the 
individual would recognize a twenty-five dollar tax loss.  
Likewise, if the corporation sold the land for seventy-five 
dollars, the corporation would recognize a twenty-five dollar 
tax loss.  Therefore, the individual would have incurred one 
twenty-five dollar economic loss (having acquired land that 
decreased in value by twenty-five dollars), but, rather than 
sell the land directly and recognize only one twenty-five 
dollar tax loss, the individual could create two twenty-five 
dollar tax losses—one to be recognized by the individual and 
one to be recognized by the corporation. 
In 2004, Congress enacted legislation to combat the 
prospect of an individual contributing built-in loss property to 
a corporation in order to extract two tax losses from one 
economic loss.105  Under rules in effect since 2004, the built-in 
loss may be preserved at only one level.106  However, 
taxpayers can decide whether to preserve the loss at the 
shareholder level or at the corporate level.107  In particular, if 
no election is filed, the built-in loss will be preserved at the 
shareholder level only.108  Thus, in the example above, the 
individual’s basis in the stock would be $100 (preserving a 
twenty-five dollar built-in loss in the stock), but the 
corporation’s basis in the land would be seventy-five dollars 
 
 102. Id. § 351(a). 
 103. Id. § 358(a)(1). 
 104. Id. § 362(a). 
 105. For an additional discussion, see Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, 
Prevention of Double Deductions of a Single Loss: Solutions in Search of a 
Problem, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2006). 
 106. I.R.C. § 362(e)(2). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. § 362(e)(2)(A). 
CAUBLE FINAL 7/23/2013  9:23 PM 
444 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
(preserving no built-in loss in the land).  However, if the 
individual and the corporation both make an election under  
§ 362(e)(2)(C), the built-in loss will be preserved at the 
corporate level only.109  In the example above, if such an 
election were made, the individual’s basis in the stock would 
be seventy-five dollars (preserving no built-in loss in the 
stock), but the corporation’s basis in the land would be $100 
(preserving a twenty-five dollar built-in loss in the land). 
As just described, in the case of the § 362(e)(2)(C) 
election, the default rule is to preserve the loss at the 
shareholder level rather than the corporate level.  Whether 
this default rule is favorable depends on many facts, 
including: whether the corporation recognizes tax gains that 
could be offset by a tax loss recognized on sale of the 
contributed property (or offset by depreciation if the 
contributed property is a depreciable asset), whether the 
shareholder recognizes tax gains that could be offset by a tax 
loss recognized on sale of the stock, when the corporation sells 
the contributed property, and when the shareholder sells the 
stock.110  Moreover, these facts will often be unknown at the 
time the election must be made.  Thus, taxpayers will have to 
make predictions in order to decide what route is favorable. 
Making an election under § 362(e)(2)(C) is likely to lead 
to lower aggregate tax liability taking into account the time 
value of money (and the default rule is likely to be 
unfavorable) if the corporation recognizes sufficient taxable 
income to utilize tax deductions and if either the contributed 
property is depreciable or the corporation is likely to sell the 
property before the shareholder sells the stock.  In such a 
case, making an election would reduce the aggregate tax 
liability of the shareholder and the corporation, taking into 
account the time value of money.  If the corporation has more 
owners than just the shareholder contributing the property, 
then the benefit of the lower corporate-level tax burden may 
accrue to all the shareholders (not just the contributing 
shareholder).  Nevertheless, the contributing shareholder 
may still agree to make the election if he or she is adequately 
 
 109. See id. § 362(e)(2)(C).  
 110. All of these facts are relevant because the election determines whether 
the corporation has a higher basis in an asset or the shareholder has a higher 
stock basis. 
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compensated by the other shareholders.   
Regarding the deadline for this election, the contributing 
shareholder must provide a signed certificate making the 
election by the due date for the shareholder’s original tax 
return for the year in which the property contribution 
occurred.111  If a taxpayer seeks to file the election late, he or 
she is unlikely to obtain relief to do so unless he or she 
requests relief within six months of the due date for filing the 
original tax return.112  As mentioned above, the advisability of 
making the election depends on future events.  Thus, 
taxpayers will not have all relevant information at the time 
the election is made, and, like the entity classification 
election, the § 362(e)(2)(C) election is forward-looking.  
Regarding persistence, once made, the § 362(e)(2)(C) election 
is irrevocable.113 
II. WHY TAX ELECTIONS ARE PROBLEMATIC 
Existing scholarship criticizes tax elections for a number 
of reasons.  First, elections erode tax revenue if taxpayers 
make elections wisely.114  A taxpayer can simply file a given 
election and obtain more favorable tax consequences without 
altering any of the nontax aspects of his or her behavior or 
transactions.  Thus, a taxpayer who uses the election wisely 
will generally make whatever choice leads to the least 
 
 111. Notice 2005-70, 2005-41 I.R.B. Elections Under § 362(e)(2)(C), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2005-41_IRB/ar12.html. 
 112. Section 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code election is a 
regulatory election as its due date is provided by a notice.  Treas. Reg.  
§ 301.9100-1(b) (2012).  Thus, the guidelines for requesting an extension of time 
to make the election are contained in sections 301.9100-2 and 301.9100-3 of the 
Treasury Regulations.  Given that the election is not listed in section 301.9100-
2(a)(2), section 301.9100-2(b) would govern a taxpayer’s ability to obtain an 
automatic extension of time.  Under that provision, if the taxpayer timely filed a 
tax return for the year in which the contribution occurred, the taxpayer would 
be able to file a late election automatically as long as it is filed within six 
months of the due date for the original tax return.  A taxpayer may only file the 
election later than this six-month timeframe if the taxpayer requests and 
obtains a private letter ruling as described in section 301.9100-3.  Requesting a 
private letter ruling is an expensive exercise.  See supra note 84.  In addition, a 
private letter ruling will only be granted in limited circumstances.  See supra 
note 85 and accompanying text. 
 113. I.R.C. § 362(e)(2)(C)(ii). 
 114. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 30–31; Yin, supra note 13, at 130. 
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amount of tax liability.115  In some cases, the taxpayer will not 
know with certainty whether an election will minimize tax 
liability because some elections are forward looking.  For 
instance, as discussed previously,116 the benefits of making an 
entity classification election or an election under  
§ 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code depend on future 
circumstances.  Thus, taxpayers will not always be able to 
achieve favorable tax outcomes because they may 
inaccurately forecast future events.  Nevertheless, because 
some taxpayers will make elections wisely and will accurately 
predict relevant future occurrences, even forward-looking 
elections erode tax revenue. 
 Second, tax elections produce unfairness.117 
Sophisticated, well-advised taxpayers will be best positioned 
to take advantage of available elections given that they are 
more likely to be aware of elections and their consequences.118  
This bias against unsophisticated taxpayers is problematic 
because it contributes to increasing wealth inequality and 
interferes with the progressivity of the tax system.  
Furthermore, unfairness can perpetuate the perception that 
the tax system is unfair which can, in turn, undermine 
 
 115. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 30–31; Yin, supra note 13, at 130. 
 116. See supra Parts I.D and I.E. 
 117. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 31–32; Yin, supra note 13, at 130, 136; 
Yorio, supra note 13, at 467.  The term “fairness” is used here to refer to vertical 
equity, which is the idea that people with a greater ability to pay taxes should 
pay more.  Tax rules that disadvantage unsophisticated taxpayers violate 
vertical equity because, at least assuming tax sophistication and wealth are 
correlated, such rules impose higher tax burdens on less wealthy taxpayers.  A 
tax election can also produce unfairness by granting more favorable tax 
treatment to persons eligible for the election than persons ineligible for the 
election.  This type of unfairness is likely best addressed by either re-examining 
the eligibility requirements for a given election or replacing an election with 
mandatory treatment. 
 118. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 32; Yin, supra note 13, at 130, 136.  For 
purposes of the proposal made by this Article, precise definitions of 
sophisticated and unsophisticated are unnecessary because the proposals made 
in this Article do not depend on whether or not a particular taxpayer is 
sophisticated.  For purposes of understanding the discussion in this Article, the 
following, imprecise definitions of sophisticated and unsophisticated should 
suffice: sophisticated taxpayers have sufficient knowledge of tax law or are 
sufficiently well-advised to evaluate the pros and cons of making tax elections, 
and unsophisticated taxpayers lack such knowledge and advice.  Assuming that 
sophistication, in this sense, tends to increase as a taxpayer’s wealth increases, 
rules that are biased against unsophisticated taxpayers are problematic from a 
fairness perspective. 
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voluntary tax compliance.119 
The bias against unsophisticated taxpayers may be 
particularly pronounced in the case of elections that are due 
prior to the date for filing a tax return.  If an election is due 
at the same time as a return, an unsophisticated taxpayer 
may seek advice in connection with return preparation (or 
may find guidance provided on a return form).  In the context 
of receiving this advice, the taxpayer could acquire 
information about the available election.120  By contrast, if the 
election is due before a tax return, an unsophisticated 
taxpayer who is unaware of the election may see no reason to 
ask for advice and, thus, will remain uninformed.  Moreover, 
if such a taxpayer later learns of the election, any attempt to 
obtain relief to file a late election will likely fail because 
taxpayers who do not seek advice before the filing deadline 
are generally not allowed to file late elections.121  Conversely, 
relief likely would be granted to a taxpayer who sought advice 
prior to the time for filing an election, always intended to 
make a favorable election, and merely failed to file the proper 
election because of a minor error.  In other words, late filing 
relief will often be available only to sophisticated taxpayers. 
Third, tax elections generate complexity.122  In order to 
evaluate whether to make an election, taxpayers must 
understand the consequences of making the election as well 
as what occurs if the election is not made.  This task can be 
particularly difficult for elections that affect future years.123  
In addition, taxpayers must determine the proper procedure 
for making the election.124  Finally, IRS examiners must be 
aware of the consequences of the election and how it is 
 
 119. Field, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing this in the context of tax 
elections).  For discussions of this phenomenon in the context of tax planning 
generally, see Michael S. Knoll, Tax Planning, Effective Marginal Tax Rates, 
and the Structure of the Income Tax, 54 TAX L. REV. 555 (2001); Leandra 
Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003); Schizer, supra note 10, at 1319. 
 120. See Emily Cauble, Making Partnerships Work for Mom and Pop and 
Everyone Else, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 247, 285 (2011). 
 121. See supra notes 80, 85 and accompanying text. 
 122. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02[1][c]; Field, supra note 
10, at 27–30; Helvey & Stetson, supra note 13, at 335; Levin, supra note 13, at 
1588; Yin, supra note 13, at 130; Yorio, supra note 13, at 463–64. 
 123. Field, supra note 10, at 27–28; Yorio, supra note 13, at 463–64. 
 124. Field, supra note 10, at 28; Yorio, supra note 13, at 464. 
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made.125 
III. WHY TAX ELECTIONS CONTINUE TO EXIST 
As described above in Part II, tax elections are 
problematic for several reasons.  Yet, hundreds of elections 
continue to inhabit tax law.  This part briefly discusses why 
elections are so prevalent despite their many flaws. 
In some cases, tax elections can only be explained by the 
political influence of those who benefit from them.126  
Nevertheless, scholars have also identified benign 
justifications for other elections.  Two explanations127 are 
offered most often. 
The first explanation is that some elections provide an 
option for taxpayers who want simplicity.128  This 
explanation, at least in part, justifies giving taxpayers the 
option to take the standard deduction rather than itemize 
deductions.129  The standard deduction is simpler than 
itemizing deductions because taxpayers can avoid the 
inconvenience of calculating and maintaining evidence of 
their actual expenses.130  Likewise, allowing divorced parents 
 
 125. Field, supra note 10 at 29–30. 
 126. This may be true in the case of certain elections in the partnership tax 
context.  For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 120. 
 127. A number of other explanations have also been suggested.  See, e.g., 
LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80,  ¶ 1.02[1]; Field, supra note 10. 
 128. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02[1]; Field, supra note 10, 
at 53–54. 
 129. See, e.g., John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction 
and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 
203, 205 (2011); Field, supra note 10, at 53–54; Louis Kaplow, The Standard 
Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax, 50 TAX L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1994); Theodore 
P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of 
Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1088–89 (2006).  The availability of the 
standard deduction has also been explained as a means of providing taxpayers 
with a minimum amount of untaxed income.  See, e.g., Brooks, supra, at 205; 
Seto & Buhai, supra, at 1088–89. 
 130. This justification may adequately explain some elections, such as the 
option to take the standard deduction and the treatment of the dependency 
exemption.  However, this explanation is also often given as the justification for 
elections that, in reality, do not provide a simple option to taxpayers.  For 
example, the simplification rationale is typically given to explain why taxpayers 
are allowed to elect among various partnership tax allocation methods under  
§ 704(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.  Yet, simplification does not adequately 
explain that election.  While taking the standard deduction truly is simpler 
than itemizing deductions, in the context of § 704(c), all available methods are 
complex.  For further discussion, see  Cauble, supra note 120. 
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to electively decide which parent claims a child as a 
dependent can be a simplifying measure if the alternative 
would involve requiring parents to keep records of the 
relative amount of support each parent provides.131 
Regarding the second explanation, scholars have 
observed that, in some cases, if an election were eliminated 
taxpayers would still choose their tax treatment.132  However, 
rather than explicitly electing their desired tax treatment, 
taxpayers would obtain the same treatment by changing 
nontax features of their transactions.133  Scholars frequently 
offer this explanation as a rationale for the rules regarding 
entity classification.134  Prior to the adoption of the check-the-
box regulations, businesses were classified as pass-through 
entities or corporations based on a multifactor test under the 
Kintner regulations.135  Under these regulations, an entity 
that had more corporate features than noncorporate features 
would be classified as a corporation.136  The key corporate 
features were: (1) continuity of life, (2) centralization of 
management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free transferability 
of interests.137  Because some of these factors were arguably 
easy to manipulate, scholars have observed that taxpayers 
would obtain their desired classification by setting up an 
entity with the right number of corporate or noncorporate 
features.138 
This type of tax planning raises all the concerns 
surrounding explicit elections.  In particular, this type of 
planning will reduce tax revenue, produce unfairness (given 
 
 131. LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02[1][a]. 
 132. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02; Field, Checking in on 
“Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–68, 497 (explaining this rationale in 
connection with the check-the-box regulations); Field, supra note 10, at 32–33. 
 133. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02; Field, Checking in on 
“Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–68, 497 (explaining this rationale in 
connection with the check-the-box regulations); Field, supra note 10, at 32–33. 
 134. See, e.g., Philip A. Curry, Claire Hill, & Francesco Parisi, Creating 
Failures in the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943, 961–62 (2007); 
Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–68, 497; Schizer, 
supra note 10, at 1319–20, 1320 n.17; David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, 
Doctrine, and Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1628–30 (1999). 
 135. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2)(3) (1960). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1). 
 138. See, e.g., Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464; 
Weisbach, supra note 134, at 1628–30, 1629 n.9. 
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that well-advised taxpayers will be best positioned to 
effectively tax plan), and contribute to the complexity of the 
tax system.139  Furthermore, because taxpayers change 
nontax features of their transactions, this type of tax 
planning, unlike explicit tax elections, distorts taxpayers’ 
decision making, which can cause inefficiency if taxpayers 
forgo transactions that would be preferable for nontax 
reasons.140  Of course, whether or not this rationale justifies 
any tax election depends on what baseline is used for 
comparison.  For example, this rationale may justify the 
check-the-box regulations if the only alternative is the state of 
the law as it existed prior to the adoption of those regulations.  
Under those prior rules, some taxpayers could and did make 
nontax changes in order to obtain more favorable tax 
treatment.141  However, this rationale offers a less convincing 
justification for the check-the-box regulations if one considers 
a wider range of alternative rules.  One such alternative 
would involve mandatory classification of entities based on 
nontax features that taxpayers are less likely to 
manipulate.142  Another alternative would involve reducing or 
 
 139. For a discussion of these problems in connection with the tax planning 
that occurred under the Kintner Regulations, see Field, Checking in on “Check-
the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–69.  For discussions of these problems in 
connection with tax planning generally, see Cauble, supra note 10; Field, supra 
note 10; Schizer, supra note 10. 
 140. For example, prior to the adoption of the check-the-box regulations, a 
taxpayer might have formed an entity with characteristics that differed from 
what would have been desirable from a non-tax standpoint.  Of course, even 
under current law, this still might be true because certain organizations are 
automatically treated as corporations for tax purposes.  See supra note 64.  For 
additional discussions of inefficiency and tax planning generally, see Cauble, 
supra note 10; Field supra note 10, at 22–23 (stating that scholars generally 
conclude that tax planning is detrimental to societal welfare); Knoll, supra note 
119, at 555; Schizer, supra note 10, at 1319; Weisbach, supra note 134, at 1632. 
 141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 142. For example, perhaps all publicly traded entities would be treated as 
corporations while all non-publicly traded entities would receive pass-through 
treatment.  See, e.g., Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the 
Future of Business Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger’s Plan, 47 TAX L. 
REV. 815, 824 (1992) (“I would argue that public verses private is both a simpler 
and a more logical place to draw the line between flow-through and separate 
entity taxation.”).  Given the value of liquidity, taxpayers may be unlikely to 
sacrifice public trading in order to obtain more favorable tax treatment.  For 
discussions of the value of liquidity, see Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay 
the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 986, 
1103–06 (1988); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the Corporate Income 
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eliminating the tax distinctions among various entity 
classifications.143 
IV. MITIGATING THE HARMS CAUSED BY TAX ELECTIONS 
As described above in Part III, tax elections persist for 
several reasons.  Moreover, regardless of the reason for a 
particular tax election’s endurance, it would be infeasible to 
abolish all tax elections. 
Given the inevitability of at least some tax elections, this 
part of the Article examines how elections could be designed 
to mitigate resulting harms.  In particular, this part of the 
Article discusses four features of elections: (1) default rules; 
(2) alerting taxpayers to the presence of an election; (3) the 
deadline for filing the election; and (4) persistence—the 
length of time during which any given election will affect tax 
consequences.144  All of these features could be better 
designed to mitigate the bias against unsophisticated 
taxpayers. 
A. Default Rules 
One feature to consider when designing any tax election 
is the default rule, or the rule that applies if the taxpayer 
fails to make an election by the relevant deadline.  Taxpayer-
favorable default rules can mitigate the bias against 
unsophisticated taxpayers.145  This is the case because, even 
 
Tax, But to Save It, 56 TAX L. REV. 329, 343–47 (2003); Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason 
& Roger H. Gordon, How Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?, 52 J. FIN. 
477, 485 (1997); Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Incidence and 
Efficiency Costs of Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms 
Produce the Same Good, 97  J. POL. ECON. 749, 756–58 (1989). 
 143. See, e.g., Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 498 
(“[T]o justify the CTB election as a simple and efficient approach to line-drawing 
between business tax regimes applicable to virtually indistinguishable forms of 
business, the existence of each separate business tax regime must be 
defended.”).  Of course, unifying the different business tax regimes is likely an 
unrealistic goal. 
 144. Other features should be considered as well.  For example, reducing the 
level of formality that is required to opt out of default treatment could benefit 
unsophisticated taxpayers, especially when the default rule is not a tailored 
default rule; in other words, when the default rule is not taxpayer-favorable in 
all cases.  For a discussion of allowing taxpayers to make effective elections 
when their intention is clear even if they have failed to comply with all formal 
requirements, see Levin supra note 13. 
 145. See Field, supra note 10, at 67.  A similar argument has been made 
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when such taxpayers fail to file an election before its 
deadline, they will receive favorable tax treatment by 
default.146  At the same time, selecting a favorable default 
rule will cause greater tax revenue erosion because less tax 
will be collected from unsophisticated taxpayers who might 
have failed to file an election even if the default rule was 
unfavorable.  Nevertheless, fairness concerns should 
outweigh tax revenue concerns given that the additional tax 
revenue is lost primarily as a result of trapping fewer unwary 
taxpayers and lost tax revenue can be recouped in fairer 
ways.147  If losing the additional tax revenue is untenable, 
serious consideration should be given to eliminating an 
election entirely and mandating the less favorable treatment 
for everyone rather than continuing to impose the less 
favorable treatment on only the ill-informed.  Moreover, 
regarding complexity, favorable default rules can reduce 
administrative burdens by diminishing the sheer number of 
elections that are filed.148 
The argument for selecting favorable default rules set 
forth above is fairly straightforward.  However, for two 
reasons, the actual design of default rules becomes somewhat 
more complicated.  First, it is not always easy to select a 
favorable default rule.  Second, extensive contract law 
literature discusses default rules and the possible 
information-forcing virtues of using unfavorable default rules 
or penalty default rules.149  Thus, no consideration of default 
rules would be complete without evaluating existing contract 
law literature and assessing whether penalty default rules 
 
regarding default rules applicable in the context of inheritance law.  See Adam 
J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1051–52 (2004). 
 146. See Field, supra note 10, at 68. 
 147. In order for the reforms proposed in this Article to promote fairness, 
foregone tax revenue would have to be recouped in fairer ways, and the analysis 
in this Article assumes that it will be.  If this assumption does not hold true, the 
proposed reforms will not necessarily promote fairness.  For similar discussion, 
see David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 240 
(2002) (“A common claim is that tax shelters reduce the progressivity of the tax 
system, because they are available only to the rich. . . .  Contrary to this 
intuition, however, there is no reason to think that reducing shelters directly 
increases progressivity.  If tax shelters were reduced, the extra revenue could be 
used to reduce other taxes on the rich.”). 
 148. See Field, supra note 10, at 67. 
 149. Id. at 66–67. 
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could be beneficial.  This part of the Article evaluates these 
points.  In order to do so, first, Part 1 discusses the existing 
contract law scholarship.  Second, Part 2 makes some 
observations about features that distinguish tax law from 
contract law which will be significant when designing default 
rules for tax law.  Finally, Part 3 discusses the design of 
default rules for tax elections in detail. 
1. Overview of Contract Law Scholarship Regarding 
Default Rules 
Default rules play an important role in contract law.  
Contracting parties typically will not specify every possible 
term that might govern their relationship.  Thus, a court may 
find it necessary to determine a contractual term in light of 
the parties’ silence.  When deciding what term to supply, the 
court will rely on relevant default rules.150 
Contract law scholars have observed that, at least in 
some cases, the default rule should approximate the term to 
which the parties would have agreed if they had considered 
the matter and specifically settled on a term.151  One virtue of 
such a default rule is that it can reduce the costs of 
contracting.152  If the law will supply the term to which they 
would have agreed, parties can remain silent on a given term 
and, thus, save the time and energy they would have 
otherwise spent anticipating and planning for every future 
contingency and drafting the requisite contractual language. 
In addition, as Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner 
discuss, a default rule that corresponds to the term to which 
the parties would have agreed could be either a tailored 
default rule or an untailored default rule.153  A tailored 
default rule aims to exactly match what the particular 
contracting parties would have wanted, while an untailored 
default rule might not match what any particular set of 
contracting parties would have selected but rather represents 
 
 150. See id. 
 151. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filing Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89–90 (1989) 
(describing and citing to scholarship that argues for default rules that mimic 
what contracting parties would have wanted). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 91. 
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what the majority of contracting parties would desire.154  In 
contract law, a tailored default rule is typically a vague, 
flexible standard under which courts supply a term that 
would be reasonable given the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.155  Examples include: the default rule for price 
provided by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
which states that, if parties intend to be bound by a contract 
but fail to specify a price, the price will be a reasonable price 
at the time for delivery;156 the rule providing that the 
quantity of goods supplied under an output or requirements 
contract cannot be unreasonably disproportionate to any 
stated estimate or, in the absence of a stated estimate, to any 
normal or otherwise comparable prior quantity;157 and rules 
governing the time for shipment or delivery of goods.158 
By contrast, an untailored default rule is usually a more 
certain rule that represents what the majority of parties 
prefer but that, given its inflexible nature, does not 
necessarily represent what any particular set of contracting 
parties might have chosen.159  Examples of untailored default 
rules may include rules under Article 2 of the UCC that 
govern the place for delivery of goods if none is specified 
(generally the seller’s place of business)160 or the time for 
making payment if not otherwise agreed (usually the time at 
which the buyer is to receive the goods).161 
The main virtue of tailored default rules is that they can 
more closely correspond to what the particular contracting 
parties would have selected.  The chief drawback of tailored 
default rules is that, because they are vague, courts may have 
to incur more costs to apply them, and they lead to more 
uncertainty regarding what term will be supplied.162  When 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1968); see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 95 
(discussing this example). 
 157. U.C.C. § 2-306(1); see also, Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 92 n.27 
(discussing this example). 
 158. U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (providing a reasonable time as the default rule). 
 159. See supra text accompanying note 154. 
 160. U.C.C. § 2-308(a) (providing that the default rule is different in some 
circumstances); U.C.C. § 2-308(b), (c). 
 161. U.C.C. § 2-310(a) (providing that a different default rule is provided in 
some cases); U.C.C.  § 2-310(b), (c). 
 162. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 
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administering a tailored default rule, a court must consider 
evidence of surrounding facts and circumstances to determine 
what term is reasonable.  By contrast, when implementing an 
untailored default rule, the court simply consults the relevant 
legal rule to find a precise term.  In addition, given its vague 
nature, a tailored default rule may be incorrectly applied by a 
court, and, as a result, the court might supply a term that is 
not, in fact, the term to which the parties would have agreed. 
While there are certain advantages to default rules that 
approximate the terms to which the parties would have 
agreed, contract law scholars have also noted that, in certain 
circumstances, it would be favorable to use penalty default 
rules (or default rules that do not mimic what at least one 
contracting party would have wanted).  As Professors Ayres 
and Gertner have discussed, setting the default rule to what 
at least one contracting party would not have wanted induces 
that party to contract out of the default rule, and, in the 
process, that party may provide valuable information.163 
Penalty default rules could encourage a contracting party 
to provide useful information in at least three ways.  First, if 
the contracting parties leave a term open, courts must incur 
publicly-subsidized costs to supply a term.164  If the 
contracting parties, instead, specify a term, these publicly-
funded costs are avoided.165  For this reason, Professors Ayres 
and Gertner suggest that, at least when it would be especially 
costly for courts to fathom the term that the parties would 
have selected, a penalty default rule that encourages the 
parties to specify a term may be helpful.166  As an example, 
Professors Ayres and Gertner contrast the price term in a 
contract for sale of goods with the quantity term.167  If price is 
 
STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1596 (1999) (“[D]efault provisions that are standards will 
often be more expensive to implement than default provisions that are rules.  
Courts, for example, in filling a price gap currently need to expend judicial 
resources to determine what the ‘reasonable’ price would have been.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 163. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93–94. 
 164. Id. at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1606. 
 165. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 162, at 1606. 
 166. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 162, at 1606. 
 167. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 162, at 1606. 
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left open, courts, by relying on the market price, have a fairly 
easy way of determining the price to which the parties would 
have agreed.168  Thus, the default rule for open price terms is 
a reasonable price and this corresponds to the term to which 
parties would have agreed.  By contrast, if the parties leave 
the quantity term entirely open, courts will not have access to 
readily available clues that provide a clear indication of the 
quantity to which the parties would have agreed.169  Thus, the 
courts will not enforce the contract, or, as Professors Ayres 
and Gertner describe it, the default rule for quantity is 
zero.170  A zero-quantity default rule is a penalty default rule 
given that no parties would bother entering into an 
agreement to sell nothing.  In other words, while there is no 
way of knowing what quantity the parties would have 
specified, it is clear that it would have been a number other 
than zero.171  It may be advisable for courts to use the zero-
quantity penalty default rule because doing so encourages 
parties to specify the quantity term themselves rather than 
imposing the cost of uncovering the appropriate quantity 
term on publicly-subsidized courts.172  Finally, in addition to 
courts incurring high costs to investigate the matter, error 
rates would likely be high because courts would often arrive 
at a quantity term that was not the term to which the parties 
would have agreed. 
Second, a penalty default rule might encourage one 
contracting party to provide useful information to another 
contracting party allowing that other party to undertake 
contractual duties in an appropriate manner.173  As an 
example of this phenomenon, Professors Ayres and Gertner 
and many others discuss the rule regarding consequential 
damages set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale.174  Hadley 
establishes the rule that a court will only award 
 
 168. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 162 at 1606. 
 169. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 162, at 1606. 
 170. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 162, at 1606. 
 171. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 97. 
 172. Id. at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1606. 
 173. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 94, 101–04. 
 174. Id. 
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consequential damages if those damages are foreseeable.175  
This rule can encourage one contracting party to provide the 
other contracting party with information about the damages 
he or she would suffer if the other party breaches.176  By doing 
so, each contracting party will have put his or her 
counterparty on notice about potential consequential 
damages so that those damages will be foreseeable and, thus, 
can be awarded if the contract is breached.  Finally, 
encouraging provision of this information may be desirable 
because, with this information, each party can properly 
calibrate their behavior so as to take the appropriate level of 
caution for avoiding breach.177 
Third, penalty default rules could encourage one 
contracting party to provide a particular type of information 
to the other contracting party—namely, information about 
the law itself.178  As Professors Ayres and Gertner observed, 
in some contractual relationships, the parties are likely to 
have different information about the relevant legal rules.179  
For example, in the employment setting, the employer may 
have more information about employment law than the 
employee given that the employer enters into more 
employment contracts than the employee.180  Employment 
arrangements can be at-will, meaning the employer may 
dismiss the employee for any reason (other than a reason 
specifically disallowed by antidiscrimination laws, for 
example) or no reason at all.181  Under current law, at-will is 
the default rule so it governs unless the parties contractually 
agree to a different standard, such as a standard under which 
an employee can be dismissed only for cause.182  Compared to 
the current at-will default rule, a for cause default rule (or a 
default rule set to what most employers arguably would not 
 
 175. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ct.). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1603, 1606; Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal 
Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 759–61 (1992). 
 179. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1603, 1606; Ayers & Gertner, supra 
note 178, at 729, 759–61. 
 180. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1603, 1606. 
 181. See id. at 1603. 
 182. See id. 
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want) might more effectively induce information sharing.  If 
employers had to specifically contract with employees to 
obtain an at-will standard, in the process, employees could 
become more informed about the rule that applied to their 
employment arrangement.183  By contrast, under the current 
rules where the default rule arguably favors employers, 
employers do not have an incentive to reveal to employees 
information about the at-will status of their employment 
relationship.  The employment relationship will be at-will if 
the contract is silent about the matter, and, as a result, 
employers can benefit from at will arrangements without 
educating the employees about the terms of their 
employment.  Employees might, incorrectly, assume they can 
be fired only for cause and, as a result, they might demand 
lower pay, for example, than what they would require if they 
knew they could be fired without cause. 
As described above, penalty default rules conceivably 
encourage contracting parties to provide information to each 
other or to a third party such as a court.  Although penalty 
default rules potentially provide these informational benefits, 
penalty default rules may also be hazardous because, for a 
variety of reasons, parties will not always opt out of a default 
rule even if another term would be preferable.  The reasons 
why parties might be stuck with default rules, even if they 
are unfavorable, fall under two broad headings.  First, some 
explanations fall under the heading of transaction costs.184  
For example, as a result of the cost of obtaining information 
about applicable legal rules, parties may not learn what the 
 
 183. Id. at 1603, 1606. 
 184. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 
YALE L.J. 611 (1989).  Transaction costs could take many forms in addition to 
the information costs mentioned above in the text.  In addition to information 
costs, transaction costs include get-together costs (the costs of getting the 
contracting parties together to negotiate for terms other than default terms), 
and decision and execution costs (costs of deciding on contractual terms and 
drafting relevant contractual language).  See, e.g., id. at 615–16.  Furthermore, 
parties might fail to contract away from a default rule if one contracting party 
strategically withholds information from the other party to avoid loss of 
bargaining power.  For example, a contracting party with high consequential 
damages might withhold that information from a counterparty to avoid paying a 
much higher rate.  See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the 
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). 
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default rule is and may, incorrectly, assume that it is 
favorable.  If so, they might fail to opt out of the default rule.  
Similarly, as a result of the costs of obtaining information, 
parties might fail to consider a future contingency that makes 
a default rule relevant and, as a result, they might not opt out 
of the default rule.  Second, some explanations for why 
parties would be stuck with an unfavorable default rule fall 
under the heading of behavioral reasons.  In particular, 
various studies show that people may fail to opt out of default 
rules because people behave as if they prefer a rule simply 
because it is the default rule.185 
2. Why Tax Law is Special 
In the tax election context, taxpayer-favorable default 
rules are beneficial in several ways.  In particular, they allow 
taxpayers to avoid the costs of filing elections, they allow the 
IRS to avoid the costs of processing elections, and they 
mitigate the bias against unsophisticated taxpayers.186  
Moreover, although, in contract law, penalty default rules 
might serve the valuable purpose of encouraging contracting 
parties to provide information to each other or third parties 
(like courts), various features that distinguish tax law from 
contract law make penalty default rules less valuable in the 
context of tax law.  Ultimately, the relevant differences 
between tax law and contract law relate to important timing 
differences between making tax elections, on the one hand, 
and selecting contract provisions, on the other hand.  This 
section discusses the relevant differences and how they affect 
the analysis. 
i. In the Tax Law Context, Mechanisms Other than 
Penalty Default Rules can be Used to Ensure 
that Taxpayers Have Relevant Information 
In tax law, the government becomes involved at an 
earlier stage and, thus, readily available mechanisms other 
than penalty default rules can ensure that each affected 
 
 185. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and 
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002). 
 186. See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text. 
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taxpayer is adequately informed, at least in the case of 
elections that are not due until a tax return is filed.187  
Furthermore, unlike penalty default rules, these mechanisms 
are not detrimental to unsophisticated taxpayers. 
To demonstrate, in contract law, one contracting party 
may possess more information about legal rules than the 
other contracting party.  In such situations, selecting a 
default rule that is disadvantageous for the more informed 
party could encourage that party to affirmatively contract out 
of the default rule, and, in the process, provide information to 
the less informed party.188  In contract law, scholars provide 
the example of selecting a default rule under which 
employees could be fired only for cause, as discussed above.189 
In the context of the tax election regarding alimony, 
Professor Field has described a similar potential use of 
penalty default rules.190  As Professor Field observes, at least 
assuming that more wealthy individuals are more 
sophisticated about tax law, often the payor of alimony may 
be more knowledgeable about tax law than the recipient.191  A 
penalty default rule (in particular, a rule that alimony is not 
deductible by the payor and is not includible in the income of 
the recipient) combined with an available election under 
which both parties could agree to the opposite treatment 
(alimony is deductible and includible in income) could 
encourage the spouse paying alimony to inform the recipient 
about the default rule and the election.192  Once the recipient 
is aware of the tax rules, the recipient would be more 
equipped to demand higher alimony payments in exchange 
for agreeing to allow the payor to deduct alimony.193 
As Professor Field acknowledges, there exists, however, a 
potential flaw with the approach of adopting such a penalty 
 
 187. In some cases, tax elections are due before tax returns must be filed and, 
in these cases, this alternative solution might not be feasible.  However, as 
discussed below, it may be advisable to eliminate or at least reduce the number 
of such elections.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 188. See supra notes 178–183 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 178–183 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 52–54. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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default rule for alimony.194  In particular, while this penalty 
default rule may operate well in cases in which one spouse is 
sophisticated and informed, this default rule 
disproportionately harms couples in which both spouses are 
unsophisticated and ill-informed.195  Such couples may be 
more likely to fail to opt out of the default treatment and, if 
so, they will incur higher aggregate tax liability (assuming 
the payor is in a higher tax bracket than the recipient).  For 
this reason, a penalty default rule may be ill-advised, 
especially given that other means could be used to ensure 
that the spouse receiving alimony is informed of the relevant 
rules, as discussed below. 
Regarding these other means of informing a party, in 
contract law, at the time parties are establishing the terms of 
the contract, courts and other third parties are not involved.  
Therefore, relying on one contracting party to inform the 
other party of applicable legal rules may be the only available 
option.  By contrast, in tax law, the government, in the 
capacity of providing information on tax return forms, is 
involved at the time the parties make tax election decisions, 
at least for elections that are filed at the same time as tax 
returns.  Thus, rather than rely on other taxpayers as the 
source of information about the law, the IRS could directly 
provide information to less informed taxpayers through tax 
forms.  For example, in the context of alimony, the default 
 
 194. Id.  “Of course, a default rule that favors a less-informed party does not 
guarantee that the taxpayer will be able to bargain effectively or that the 
taxpayers, as a unit, will reach the agreement that best minimizes their 
aggregate tax burden.  Taxpayers may make uneducated or ill-advised 
decisions.”  Id. at 54. 
 195. Given that alimony is generally only awarded when one party has 
significant wealth, the likelihood of encountering two unsophisticated taxpayers 
in the alimony context may not be particularly high.  Nonetheless, in some 
cases, the parties may fail to consider tax consequences.  Furthermore, the fact 
that divorcing parties may seek legal representation during their divorce can 
reduce the likelihood of encountering unsophisticated parties in the divorce 
context because the parties may be advised by their lawyers.  However, not all 
divorce lawyers will be aware of the relevant tax rules.  Id. at 24 (“Not all 
divorce lawyers are sophisticated tax planners . . . .”).  In addition, not all 
divorcing parties will have legal representation.  Id. at 24 n.92 (mentioning that 
divorcing parties are increasingly representing themselves and observing that, 
although “divorcing spouses are more likely to retain lawyers in the situations 
where the dependency allocation election and/or the alimony election may be 
available . . . a significant number of divorcing spouses . . . proceeded pro se”). 
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rule could provide (and does provide) that alimony is 
deductible and includible in income.  Furthermore, the 
recipient could be given the right to elect unilaterally to 
exclude the payment from income as long as he or she informs 
the payor so that the payor cannot take a deduction, and as 
long as the parties have not explicitly agreed otherwise.  
Finally, information specifically provided on a tax return 
could inform the recipient of the relevant legal rules and the 
availability of the election, and electronic tax return 
preparation can alleviate any additional complexity 
associated with providing more information to taxpayers, as 
discussed in Part IV.B. below.  Once the recipient was 
informed of the relevant rules, he or she would be able to 
demand higher alimony payments from the payor in exchange 
for agreeing to not exercise the option to exclude the payment 
from income. 
ii. It is Often Easier to Determine what Taxpayers 
would have Wanted Than it is to Determine 
what Contracting Parties would have 
Wanted 
Timing distinguishes tax law and contract law because, 
while many tax elections are backward looking, contract 
provisions are always forward looking.196  Because of this 
difference, at least in the case of elections that are backward 
looking, the IRS can easily determine what election taxpayers 
would have made.  In contract law, penalty default rules can 
encourage contracting parties to specify terms.197  For 
example, as discussed above, the zero-quantity default rule 
induces contracting parties to specify the quantity of goods 
they intend to sell because, if they fail to designate a 
quantity, the court will supply zero as the quantity term.198  
By encouraging contracting parties to indicate a quantity, 
courts avoid the high costs of trying to divine what quantity 
the parties desired and steer clear of the risk of determining a 
quantity that differs from what the parties intended.199 
 
 
 196. See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion. 
 197. See supra notes 164–172 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra notes 164–172 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 164–172 and accompanying text. 
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In contrast to contract law, in tax law, it is less necessary 
for the parties to affirmatively make a tax election because, 
without much effort, the IRS can decide what tax election the 
parties would have wanted in the case of backward-looking 
elections.  Because tax elections affect tax outcomes only, 
taxpayers would want whatever election minimizes the 
aggregate tax liability of the affected taxpayers.  Thus, unlike 
contract terms with respect to which individuals have varied 
preferences, tax election preferences are rather predictable.  
Further, many tax elections are backward looking.  In other 
words, in many cases, at the time an election is due, 
taxpayers will have access to all information necessary to 
conclude whether a given election minimizes tax liability.  For 
backward-looking elections, in order for the IRS to determine 
what election taxpayers would have made, the IRS only needs 
to examine the information that was available to taxpayers as 
of the due date for the election and mathematically calculate 
what election would have minimized tax liability.200  At least 
if taxpayers provide the relevant information, the IRS can 
make the determination fairly cheaply and with very low risk 
of failing to select what the taxpayers would have wanted.  
Moreover, if the IRS incurs additional administrative costs in 
order to request necessary information from taxpayers, the 
IRS could impose a monetary penalty on taxpayers to cover 
this cost rather than penalize taxpayers by depriving them of 
the benefits of a favorable election.201 
 
 200. Furthermore, particularly as electronic filing of tax returns becomes 
more and more common, the administrative costs of making this determination 
will decrease. 
 201. Other scholars have observed that penalties short of loss of favorable tax 
elections can encourage taxpayers to file returns and provide information.  See, 
e.g., Levin, supra note 13, at 1606; Charles S. Lyon, Tax Blunders: Treasury 
Should Reduce Their Cost, 45 TAXES 575, 594 (1967) (suggesting that late filing 
of elections could be penalized with a “smaller financial price” than “complete 
forfeiture of favorable tax treatment”); Yorio, supra note 13, at 479.  A similar 
argument has been made regarding court costs in the context of contract law.  
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 571 (2006) (“[T]he obvious remedy . . . is to charge 
parties a fee for using the court system.”).  In the contract law context, while 
this solution ensures that the contracting parties bear court costs, it does not 
address the problems stemming from the fact that courts, inevitably, will make 
errors and supply terms the differ from what the parties would have wanted.  
By contrast, in the context of some tax elections, it will often be easy to 
determine what the parties would have wanted so errors will be less likely. 
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iii. Tailored Default Rules Are Often Easier to 
Administer in the Tax Context than the 
Contract Context 
Also because of the backward-looking nature of many tax 
elections, tailored default rules in tax law, unlike contract 
law, often need not be vague, ill-defined standards.  A tailored 
default rule aims to exactly match what the particular parties 
would have wanted, while an untailored default rule might 
not match what any particular set of parties would have 
selected but rather represents what the majority of parties 
would desire.202  In contract law, a tailored default rule is 
typically a vague, flexible standard under which courts 
supply a term that would be reasonable given the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.203  As a result of their 
vague nature, tailored default rules in contract law are costly 
to apply because courts must consider available evidence to 
determine what term is reasonable.204  In addition, there is a 
significant risk that a court will select a term that is not, in 
fact, the term to which the parties would have agreed. 
By contrast, in tax law, tailored default rules could often 
be easy to apply because tailored default rules can be clearly 
defined.  For example, in the context of alimony, the current 
rule is an untailored default rule.205  Under current law, by 
default, alimony is deductible by the payor and is included in 
the recipient’s income.206  This rule is favorable for the 
majority of taxpayers because, in most cases, the payor is in a 
higher tax bracket than the recipient.  However, it is not 
necessarily favorable for any particular divorced couple 
because, in the case of any particular couple, the recipient 
could be in a higher tax bracket than the payor. 
A tailored default rule would be taxpayer-favorable in all 
cases, not just in the majority of cases.  In the context of 
alimony, such a rule would provide that, unless the parties 
elect otherwise: (i) in any year in which the payor is in a 
higher marginal tax bracket than the recipient, alimony is 
deductible and includible in income and (ii) in any year in 
 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 154–155. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 154–155. 
 204. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra Part I.B. 
 206. See supra Part I.B. 
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which the recipient is in a higher tax bracket than the payor, 
alimony is not deductible and not includible in income.207  At 
least for the election regarding alimony (and other backward-
looking elections), a tailored default rule is not difficult to 
apply.  The IRS or the court would only need to know the 
income information for the payor and recipient for the 
relevant year (information which should already be included 
on the individuals’ tax returns).  With this information, the 
IRS can apply the tailored default rule to determine precisely 
what the taxpayers would have wanted. 
In cases in which it is difficult to design an untailored 
default rule, tailored default rules may be particularly useful.  
For example, as discussed above, it is unclear whether the 
majority of divorced couples would benefit from the custodial 
parent claiming a child as a dependent or from the 
noncustodial parent doing so.  This is unclear because it is not 
obvious whether, in the majority of divorced couples, the 
custodial parent is in a higher or lower tax bracket than the 
noncustodial parent.  Furthermore, even if this matter is 
settled empirically, it very well could be the case that the 
majority is not much larger than fifty percent.  In other 
words, instead of, for example, finding that, in ninety percent 
of couples, the noncustodial parent is in a higher tax bracket 
than the custodial parent, one might discover that this is true 
for only sixty percent of couples.  Thus, although an 
untailored default rule (providing for the noncustodial parent 
to take the exemption) would minimize tax liability most of 
the time (in particular, in sixty percent of cases), such a 
default rule would fail to minimize tax liability quite often (in 
particular, in forty percent of cases).  For this reason, a 
tailored default rule may be preferable.  A tailored default 
rule would provide that, by default, whichever parent was in 
a higher marginal tax bracket would take the exemption.208 
Although applying a tailored default rule to backward-
looking elections is fairly simple, applying a tailored default 
rule to forward-looking elections could be quite costly and 
difficult.209  The task of administering a tailored default rule 
for a forward-looking election more closely resembles the task 
 
 207. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.3.iii. 
 208. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.3.iii. 
 209. For further discussion, see infra Parts IV.A.3.ii, IV.A.3.iv. 
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of administering a tailored default rule in contract law 
because all contract provisions are forward looking.  When a 
court employs a tailored default rule in contract law, the 
court must determine the term to which the parties would 
have agreed at the time the parties entered into the 
contract.210  Because the contract term governs the parties’ 
relationship going forward, the parties would have designed a 
contract term based on what they anticipated would occur 
after entering into the contract.  For instance, the quantity to 
which the parties would have agreed in a contract for sale of 
goods would depend on what the buyer and seller anticipated 
regarding future business needs, future production capacity, 
and future market prices.  Thus, if a court must apply a 
tailored default rule to determine what the parties would 
have wanted, the court would be required to assess what the 
parties would have anticipated as of the date the contract was 
formed.  The task of applying a tailored default rule to a 
forward-looking tax election is similar.  In this case, too, a 
court or the IRS would need to discover what future events 
would have been predicted by the taxpayers as of the 
election’s due date and select whatever tax treatment would 
have appeared favorable based on those predictions.  For 
these reasons, tailored default rules should be used for 
backward-looking elections but likely should be avoided for 
forward-looking elections. 
3. Designing Tax Election Default Rules 
The observations discussed above can be used to inform 
how tax election default rules should be designed in 
particular cases.  As discussed below, unless the default rule 
is insignificant because of an election’s other parameters, 
tailored default rules generally should accompany backward-
looking elections, while untailored default rules should be 
associated with forward-looking elections.  Generally, penalty 
default rules ought to be avoided.211 
 
 
 210. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.  
 211. This is true for the elections discussed in this Article.  It is also true in 
most other cases, given that penalty default rules can disproportionately harm 
unsophisticated taxpayers and given that penalty default rules are not 
particularly useful in the tax context as discussed in Part IV.A.2. 
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In addition to varying in terms of whether they are 
backward-looking or forward-looking, tax elections vary with 
regard to whether they affect taxpayers whose interests are 
aligned or taxpayers whose interests diverge.  If an election 
affects taxpayers whose interests are aligned, the taxpayers 
can readily agree on what election is made without one 
taxpayer compensating another taxpayer for making a given 
election.  If an election affects taxpayers with divergent 
interests, the identity of the taxpayer who has the right to 
make the election can significantly affect how the taxpayers 
share the election’s tax benefit which, in turn, has important 
distributional consequences.  Thus, when an election affects 
taxpayers whose interests diverge, election parameters 
should be designed with the goal of encouraging parties to 
share the tax benefit in an equitable manner. 
This part discusses proposed election default rules for 
four categories of elections: (i) backward-looking elections 
that affect taxpayers whose interests are aligned, (ii) forward-
looking elections that affect taxpayers whose interests are 
aligned, (iii) backward-looking elections that affect taxpayers 
with divergent interests, and (iv) forward-looking elections 
that affect taxpayers with divergent interests.  The proposed 
default rules are intended to mitigate the bias against 
unsophisticated taxpayers. 
i. Backward-Looking Elections that Affect 
Taxpayers Whose Interests Are Aligned 
An example of a backward-looking election that affects 
taxpayers whose interests are aligned212 is the choice between 
taking the standard deduction and itemizing deductions.  
Generally, in the case of backward-looking elections, tailored 
default rules may be advisable, as discussed above.213  
However, the current default rule for this election, under 
which the taxpayer is entitled to the standard deduction, is 
necessary as a practical matter because the IRS will not be 
able to calculate itemized deductions if the taxpayer 
persistently fails to provide information about his or her 
 
 212. In some cases, the election affects only one taxpayer, while, in other 
cases, particularly in the case of a married couple, the election affects multiple 
taxpayers whose interests are aligned. 
 213. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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actual expenses. 
Moreover, in the case of this particular election, because 
taxpayers are given ample opportunity to make an election,214 
the default rule is of limited importance and likely need not 
be changed to further protect unsophisticated taxpayers.  
Providing taxpayers with multiple opportunities to make an 
election serves nearly the same function as a tailored default 
rule.  Like a tailored default rule, providing numerous 
chances to make an election allows taxpayers to receive 
favorable treatment even when they fail to file an election.  
For instance, if a taxpayer fails to file a tax return (and, thus, 
fails to elect between the standard deduction and itemizing 
deductions), the IRS will likely file a substitute return using 
the standard deduction.215  Once a substitute return is filed, a 
taxpayer could file a corrected return.216  In this return, if it is 
beneficial to do so, the taxpayer could itemize deductions, and 
the taxpayer would not lose favorable tax treatment as a 
result of a failure to initially make an election.217  Unlike a 
tailored default rule, repeated opportunities to make an 
election can only assist taxpayers who eventually take action.  
Thus, if the taxpayer does not file a corrected return, he or 
she will not be entitled to itemize deductions even if doing so 
would be advantageous.218 
Finally, as discussed above, in the tax context, devices 
other than loss of favorable tax treatment can encourage 
taxpayers to provide information.219  In the case of the 
standard deduction, the law already takes this approach.220  A 
taxpayer who fails to file a return does not automatically lose 
the opportunity to make a favorable election because the 
taxpayer can do so in a corrected return.221  Instead, the 
taxpayer likely would be subject to a monetary penalty for 
failure to file, and this penalty, rather than loss of the ability 
to make an election, can induce timely filing. 
 
 214. See supra Part I.A. 
 215. See supra Part I.A. 
 216. See supra Part I.A. 
 217. See supra Part I.A. 
 218. See supra Part I.A. 
 219. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 220. See supra Part I.A. 
 221. See supra Part I.A. 
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ii. Forward-Looking Elections that Affect Taxpayers 
Whose Interests Are Aligned 
The entity classification election is a forward-looking 
election that affects taxpayers whose interests are aligned.  
Even if a business has more than one owner,222 the owners 
can easily align their interests because each owner can hold 
an interest in the business through a different entity.223 
In order to mitigate the bias against unsophisticated 
taxpayers, the default rule for entity classification should be 
taxpayer favorable.  However, a tailored default rule would be 
costly to administer given that the election is forward looking.  
In order to apply a tailored default rule, anytime a taxpayer 
failed to file an entity classification election, the IRS would 
need to assess what the taxpayer would have wanted based 
on information available to the taxpayer as of the election’s 
due date.  What the taxpayer would have wanted depends on 
the taxpayer’s expectations regarding future events, including 
the future profitability of the underlying business.  Thus, the 
IRS would have to consider evidence bearing on the 
taxpayer’s predictions for the future of the business as of the 
due date for the election.  Making this determination would 
be costly and the risk of error would be high.  Because of the 
downsides of employing a tailored default rule, an untailored 
default rule is preferable.  Moreover, current law already 
provides for an untailored default rule, at least for U.S. 
entities given that, by default, U.S. entities receive pass-
through treatment, which is favorable in most cases.224 
 
 
 222. If an entity has one owner, the election can affect two taxpayers—the 
entity and the owner.  However, given that the owner owns 100% of the entity, 
the interests of the entity and the owner are aligned. 
 223. For example, if A, B, and, C own a business, they could form a 
partnership to hold the business assets directly.  The partnership could, in turn, 
be owned by A, B, and, a corporation (100% of which was owned by C).  This 
ownership structure allows C to own the business through a corporation while 
the other individuals own the business through pass-through entities.  
Likewise, if C already owned a business that was treated as a corporation and A 
and B wanted to join the business but preferred pass-through treatment, the 
corporation owned by C could contribute its assets to a partnership that A and 
B join.  Because businesses can be easily arranged so that all owners obtain 
their desired tax treatment, owners can easily resolve any disagreement over 
how to treat the entity. 
 224. See supra Part I.D. 
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Finally, because the default rule is untailored, some 
taxpayers will benefit from opting out of default treatment.  
For this reason, other features of the election should be 
designed to increase the likelihood that unsophisticated 
taxpayers will consider the election and make an informed 
decision.  For example, changing the due date for the election 
to the due date for the entity’s first tax return is advisable.  If 
the election is due with a tax return, unsophisticated 
taxpayers can obtain advice regarding the election in the 
context of seeking assistance with tax return preparation, 
and the IRS can alert taxpayers to the availability of the 
election by providing specific information on tax return 
forms.225 
iii. Backward-Looking Elections that Affect 
Taxpayers With Divergent Interests 
Examples of backward-looking elections that affect 
taxpayers with divergent interests include the election 
regarding the tax treatment of alimony and the election by 
divorced parents that determines which parent claims a child 
as a dependent.226  In the context of these examples, tailored 
default rules would further the aim of reducing bias against 
unsophisticated taxpayers, which should be the dominant 
consideration when selecting default rules, as discussed 
above.227  In addition, because the tax elections are backward 
looking, applying tailored default rules is not overly 
burdensome.228  Furthermore, adopting tailored default rules 
can alleviate the difficulty of designing an untailored default 
rule in the case of the dependency exemption election.229  
Implementing these recommendations would involve 
changing the current parameters of these elections. 
 
 225. See infra Part IV.B.  Some taxpayers will receive tax advice in 
connection with seeking general legal advice before starting a business.  
However, not all taxpayers will seek general legal advice, and not all legal 
advisors will provide adequate tax counsel.  It might be possible, however, to 
provide tax information on formation documents, to at least assist businesses 
that are formed as state law entities.  Such information could alert taxpayers to 
the existence of the entity classification election even earlier than the tax return 
deadline. 
 226. See supra Part I.B.–C. 
 227. See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 205–08 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text. 
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In the context of the alimony election, a tailored default 
rule would provide that: (1) if the spouse paying alimony is in 
a higher tax bracket than the spouse receiving alimony in any 
given year,230 the payment is deductible by the payor and 
included in income by the recipient, and (2) if the spouse 
receiving alimony is in a higher tax bracket than the spouse 
paying alimony in any given year,231 the payment is not 
deductible by the payor and not included in income by the 
recipient.232  If neither (1) nor (2) applies because the spouses 
are in the same tax bracket,233 the default rule could provide 
 
 230. In particular, rule (1) applies if the payor’s marginal tax bracket based 
on taxable income calculated after deducting alimony is higher than the 
recipient’s marginal tax bracket based on taxable income calculated after 
including alimony in income. 
 231. In particular, rule (2) applies if the payor’s marginal tax bracket based 
on taxable income calculated without a deduction for alimony is lower than the 
recipient’s marginal tax bracket based on taxable income calculated without 
including alimony in income. 
 232. One might object to the proposal on the grounds that it makes it more 
difficult to discern what the default rule is.  For example, spouses would need to 
share information about their taxable incomes in order to determine what the 
default rule is.  However, making a default rule more difficult to determine does 
not necessarily complicate the law because taxpayers can still take action 
without knowing the default rule.  For example, for non-U.S. entities, the 
applicable default classification depends on whether owners of the entity have 
limited liability under applicable non-U.S. law.  Some taxpayers will file a 
protective classification election, because determining whether all owners have 
limited liability could be difficult and involve obtaining an opinion from non-
U.S. legal counsel.  In other words, they will affirmatively elect their desired tax 
treatment without knowing for certain that doing so is absolutely necessary (in 
other words, without knowing for certain that the elected treatment is different 
than default treatment).  Similarly, in the alimony context, even without 
knowing the default rule, taxpayers could proceed by either: (i) explicitly 
agreeing that the paying spouse will deduct alimony and the receiving spouse 
will include alimony in income, or (ii) affirmatively electing the alternative 
treatment.  The spouses would need to share taxable income information with 
each other if they want to evaluate what election leads to the most favorable tax 
treatment.  However, even under current law, spouses need to share this 
information in order to evaluate the pros and cons of making a given election. 
 233. The tie-breaking rule, in fact, could be slightly more complicated.  In 
particular, one could ask why rules (1) and (2) do not apply.  This could arise for 
different reasons.  One possibility is that, no matter how alimony is treated, the 
spouses will always be in the same tax bracket.  For example, assume that, 
prior to taking alimony into account, payor’s taxable income is $60,000 and 
recipient’s taxable income is $40,000.  Assume the amount of alimony is 
$10,000.  For 2012, an individual will be in the 25% marginal tax bracket if his 
or her income is between $35,350 and $85,650.  The payor’s taxable income falls 
in this range with or without the deduction (it is $50,000 with the deduction and 
$60,000 without the deduction).  Likewise, the recipient’s taxable income falls in 
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that the payor would not deduct the alimony and the 
recipient would not include it in his or her income.234  
Regarding opting out of the default rule, the spouse receiving 
alimony could unilaterally decide to exclude alimony from 
income in any given year by providing notice to the paying 
spouse of this decision prior to the tax return due date for 
that year and including a copy of this notice with the 
recipient spouse’s tax return.  The spouse receiving alimony 
could make this election unless the divorce agreement or an 
amendment to it applicable to a particular year explicitly 
provided otherwise.  If provided with such notice, the paying 
spouse would not be allowed to deduct alimony, unless the 
parties had explicitly agreed otherwise.  As discussed below, 
 
this range with or without including alimony in income (it is $50,000 if the 
alimony is included and $40,000 if it is not).  In this situation, the tie-breaking 
rule described in the text would apply so that, by default, alimony is not 
deductible and not includible in income.  Another possibility is that the parties 
begin in different tax brackets but the alimony payment is enough to move the 
parties into the same tax bracket.  For example, assume that, prior to taking 
alimony into account, the payor’s taxable income is $90,000 and recipient’s 
taxable income is $80,000.  Assume the amount of alimony is $10,000.  Again, 
for 2012, an individual will be in the 25% marginal tax bracket if his or her 
income is between $35,350 and $85,650, while an individual will be in the 28% 
marginal tax bracket for income over $85,650 and up to $178,650.  The payor’s 
taxable income reaches the 28% marginal tax bracket without the deduction but 
does not reach beyond the 25% marginal tax bracket with the deduction (it is 
$80,000 with the deduction and $90,000 without the deduction).  The recipient’s 
taxable income reaches the 28% marginal tax bracket if alimony is included in 
income but does not extend beyond the 25% marginal tax bracket if alimony is 
excluded (it is $90,000 if the alimony is included and $80,000 if it is not).  In 
this case, the default rule could provide that a portion of the alimony is 
deductible (and includible in income) and a portion of the alimony is not 
deductible (and not includible in income).  The portion that is deductible (and 
includible in income) is the minimum amount necessary to make it so that the 
payor’s marginal tax bracket, based on taxable income calculated after the 
deduction of that portion, is the same as the recipient’s marginal tax bracket, 
based on taxable income calculated after including that portion in income.  
Thus, in the example above, the payor would deduct $4350 (bringing his or her 
taxable income to $85,650 and thus within the 25% marginal tax bracket), and 
the recipient would include this $4350 in income (bringing his or her taxable 
income to $84,350, still within the 25% marginal tax bracket). 
 234. This choice is somewhat arbitrary.  However, it is a logical choice if the 
recipient is granted a unilateral right to exclude alimony from income.  When 
the spouses are in the same tax bracket, the recipient would likely exercise this 
unilateral right given that the spouses’ aggregate tax liability would not be 
reduced by allowing the paying spouse to deduct alimony.  Because the recipient 
would likely opt to exclude alimony from income, selecting this result as the 
default rule can reduce administrative costs. 
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tax return forms could provide information to ensure that 
individuals were aware of the election. 
The parameters described above accomplish two goals.  
First, if both spouses are unsophisticated and, as a result, 
they fail to consider the election and make an informed 
choice, their aggregate tax liability will, nevertheless, be 
minimized under the tailored default rule described above.235  
In some cases, the payor might be sophisticated while the 
recipient is unsophisticated.  Moreover, in such a case, the 
payor would receive favorable tax treatment by default if he 
or she was in a higher tax bracket than the recipient because, 
in that case, the payor would be entitled to deduct alimony by 
default.  Thus, it might seem that the payor would lack any 
incentive to inform the recipient of his or her ability to make 
a contrary election.  Nevertheless, the mechanics of the 
election described above do induce the payor to provide this 
information.  In particular, the spouse receiving alimony 
could learn about the available election from tax return forms 
and could opt out of the default treatment unilaterally 
(making alimony not deductible and not includible in income).  
Knowing this, the informed paying spouse would have an 
incentive to obtain the receiving spouse’s explicit agreement 
not to exercise this election, and the receiving spouse would 
be positioned to demand greater alimony payments in 
exchange for agreeing not to exercise the election.236  In this 
 
 235. As an example of how this would affect taxpayers, consider a couple in 
which the spouse paying alimony (P) is in a lower tax bracket than the spouse 
receiving alimony (R) in a given year.  Assume the couple is unsophisticated and 
fails to consider the tax treatment of alimony.  Also, assume they have made no 
designation regarding the tax treatment of alimony in their separation 
agreement or any amendment to that agreement.  The individuals file tax 
returns.  P deducts alimony, and R includes alimony in income.  Given the 
individuals’ tax brackets, this treatment results in higher aggregate tax liability 
than the alternative (P not deducting alimony and R excluding alimony from 
income).  Under current law, the individuals would receive this less favorable 
tax treatment because it is consistent with the default rule, and they have not 
taken the necessary steps to opt out of the default rule.  Under the proposed 
rule, the individuals would have reported the wrong tax treatment.  By default, 
in this case, P should not deduct the payment and R should exclude it from 
income.  Furthermore, the individuals did not take the steps necessary to opt 
out of the default rule.  Therefore, they incorrectly reported their tax treatment.  
Because the individuals reported the wrong tax treatment, they could later 
amend their tax returns, or the IRS might correct the mistake. 
 236. This analysis assumes that non-tax law provides the parties with 
sufficient flexibility to negotiate over alimony payments, which might not 
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way, the recipient can share in some of the economic benefit 
resulting from the payor’s ability to deduct alimony. 
In the context of the dependency exemption election, a 
tailored default rule would provide that whichever parent is 
in a higher tax bracket237 in any given year will claim a child 
as a dependent.238  As a result of this tailored default rule, if 
both spouses fail to consider the election due to a lack of 
sophistication, their aggregate tax liability, nevertheless, will 
be minimized.239  Moreover, this tailored default rule will 
result in favorable tax consequences more often than an 
untailored default rule, as discussed above.240  If the parents 
are in the same tax bracket in any given year, the default rule 
could provide that the custodial parent will claim the child as 
a dependent.241 
Regarding opting out of the default rule, because there 
may be policy reasons for ensuring that the custodial parent 
receives some of the economic benefit of claiming the child as 
a dependent,242 the custodial parent could have the unilateral 
 
always be the case. 
 237. To take into account the possibility that the exemption could move one 
or both of the spouses from a higher tax bracket to a lower tax bracket, the 
default rule could be implemented in a way that is similar to the proposed 
implementation for alimony discussed supra note 233.  In addition, to be 
taxpayer-favorable in all cases, the default rule would need to be more complex 
because other factors can affect the analysis of which parent should claim the 
child as a dependent.  See supra note 60. 
 238. Such a default rule is not without precedent because a similar rule 
already applies in some cases in which multiple taxpayers would be entitled to 
claim a dependent.  See I.R.C. §§ 152(c)(4)(A)(ii), 152(c)(4)(B)(ii) (2012).  One 
might object to the proposal on the grounds that it makes it more difficult to 
discern what the default rule is.  For a discussion of this concern, see supra note 
232. 
 239. This is true as long as either: (1) the taxpayers file their returns 
correctly (correctly meaning in a way that happens to coincide with the default 
rule given that the taxpayers have not affirmatively opted out of the default 
rule), or (2) the taxpayers file their returns incorrectly and either the IRS audits 
and corrects the returns or the taxpayers eventually discover their error and 
amend their returns.  For further discussion, see supra note 235. 
 240. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.  
 241. This choice is somewhat arbitrary.  However, it is a logical choice if the 
custodial parent is granted a unilateral right to claim the exemption for the 
same reason that a similar choice is logical in the context of alimony.  See supra 
note 234.  In addition, this rule helps to ensure that the custodial parent obtains 
some of the economic benefit of the exemption which is a desirable goal.  See 
infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 67 
(“Allocation of the dependency exemption to the parent with custody of the 
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right to claim the child as a dependent in any given year by 
providing notice to the noncustodial parent of this decision 
prior to the tax return due date for that year and including a 
copy of this notice with the custodial parent’s tax return.  The 
custodial parent could make this election unless the couple 
had explicitly agreed otherwise, and, absent such an explicit 
agreement, the noncustodial parent would not be allowed to 
claim the child as a dependent if provided with notice by the 
custodial parent.243  Granting the custodial parent this right 
would give the custodial parent leverage to demand payments 
from the noncustodial parent in exchange for agreeing not to 
exercise this right.  Thus, if doing so would reduce aggregate 
tax liability, the noncustodial parent could claim an 
exemption and pay part of the economic benefit of the 
deduction to the custodial parent. 
Finally, to ensure that the custodial parent was aware of 
the election and thereby in a position to negotiate with the 
noncustodial parent, tax return forms could provide 
taxpayers with information regarding this election.244  
Providing information in this manner reduces the need to 
identify the spouse who is likely to be more informed245 and 
select a default rule that encourages the more informed 
spouse to educate the other spouse.246 
 
children directs the tax benefit to the household in which the children primarily 
reside, thereby hopefully conferring a distributional benefit on these 
households.”). 
 243. Also, if in any given case the default rule would provide that the 
custodial parent is entitled to the exemption (because he or she is in a higher 
tax bracket), then, in order to opt out of the default rule, both parents would 
have to either: (i) specify in their divorce agreement that the noncustodial 
parent will claim the exemption, or (ii) check a box on their individual returns 
affirmatively stating that they have agreed that the noncustodial parent will 
claim the exemption. 
 244. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B. 
 245. This task can be difficult, as Professor Field observes, given that it is 
difficult to generalize about whether custodial parents or noncustodial parents 
are typically more sophisticated.  See, Field, Tax Elections & Private 
Bargaining, supra note 13, at 41–42. 
 246. The mechanics of the rules proposed in this Article, see supra Part 
IV.A.3.iii, can be more fully illustrated with several examples.  In the first 
example (Example 1), assume the noncustodial parent (NCP) is in a higher tax 
bracket than the custodial parent (CP).  Assume that, at the time of the parents’ 
divorce, NCP is aware of the election and CP is not.  In Example 1, by default, 
NCP would be entitled to claim the exemption because NCP is in a higher tax 
bracket than CP.  See supra text accompanying note 238.  However, NCP knows 
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that, at tax return time, CP will see information specifying that CP can 
unilaterally claim the exemption (and force NCP to not claim the exemption) 
unless CP has agreed not to exercise this right.  See supra notes 242–43 and 
accompanying text.  Therefore, at the time of the divorce, NCP will have an 
incentive to obtain CP’s agreement to not exercise this right.  In the process, CP 
will learn about the election (from NCP), and, thus, CP will be in a position to 
demand greater support in exchange for his or her agreement not the exercise 
this right.  In the second example (Example 2), assume the custodial parent 
(CP) is in a higher tax bracket than the noncustodial parent (NCP).  Assume 
that, at the time of the parents’ divorce, neither NCP nor CP is aware of the 
election, and, thus, they do not mention it in their divorce agreement.  Further, 
in Example 2, assume the parties do not see information about the election on 
tax returns and prepare their returns in an uninformed manner.  As it happens, 
NCP claims the exemption and CP does not claim the exemption.  In Example 2, 
by default, CP would be entitled to claim the exemption because CP is in a 
higher tax bracket than NCP.  See supra text accompanying note 238.  Further, 
in Example 2, assuming the parties have not affirmatively checked boxes on 
their returns to opt out of this default treatment, the default rule would still 
apply.  See supra note 243.  Thus, the parties would have filed incorrect tax 
returns because CP should have claimed the exemption rather than NCP.  
Because the individuals reported the wrong tax treatment, they could later 
amend their tax returns, or the IRS could audit their returns and correct the 
mistake.  In the third example (Example 3), assume the noncustodial parent 
(NCP) is in a higher tax bracket than the custodial parent (CP).  Assume that, 
at the time of the parents’ divorce, neither NCP nor CP is aware of the election.  
Further, in Example 3, assume the parties do not see information about the 
election on tax returns and prepare their returns in an uninformed manner.  As 
it happens, CP claims the exemption and NCP does not claim the exemption.  In 
Example 3, by default, NCP would be entitled to claim the exemption because 
NCP is in a higher tax bracket than CP.  See supra text accompanying note 238.  
Further, in Example 3, assuming that CP has not affirmatively exercised his or 
her right to elect to claim the exemption and, thereby, opt out of this default 
treatment, the default rule would still apply.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 242–43.  Thus, the parties would have filed incorrect tax returns because 
NCP should have claimed the exemption rather than CP.  Because the 
individuals reported the wrong tax treatment, they could later amend their tax 
returns, or the IRS could audit their returns and correct the mistake.  One 
might object to the results of Example 3 on the grounds that it subverts the goal 
of allowing the custodial parent to benefit from the exemption.  Four responses 
to this objection are worth noting.  First, providing more information to 
taxpayers, as discussed below in Part IV.B, will decrease the likelihood that 
Example 3 will occur because the custodial parent will be more informed about 
his or her rights to unilaterally claim the exemption.  Second, if the taxpayers 
are unsophisticated and are in the same tax bracket, the custodial parent is 
entitled to the exemption by default which further protects the interests of 
custodial parents.  See supra note 241.  Third, under the facts of Example 3, 
rather than correct both tax returns (allowing NCP to claim the exemption and 
not allowing CP to claim the exemption) so as to decrease NCP’s tax liability 
and increase CP’s tax liability, the IRS could determine the appropriate 
aggregate decrease in the parents’ tax liability and apply that to CP’s taxes.  
For example, assume CP is in a 15% marginal tax bracket with or without the 
exemption, and assume NCP is in a 25% marginal tax bracket with or without 
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iv. Forward-Looking Elections that Affect Taxpayers 
With Divergent Interests 
The election under § 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue 
Code is forward-looking and can affect taxpayers with 
divergent interests. As described previously, if a shareholder 
contributes built-in loss property to a corporation and the tax 
loss is not recognized at the time of the contribution, the 
built-in loss will be preserved for future recognition.247  In 
particular, either the contributing shareholder will hold stock 
in the corporation with a built-in loss so that the shareholder 
will recognize a tax loss upon a future sale of the stock, or the 
corporation will hold the asset with a built-in loss so that the 
corporation will recognize a tax loss upon a future sale of the 
asset.248  Under current law, if no election is made to the 
contrary, the built-in loss is preserved in the shareholder’s 
stock, but, if the corporation and shareholder file an election 
under § 362(e)(2)(C), the built-in loss will be preserved in the 
asset held by the corporation.249 
Whether making the election will reduce the 
shareholder’s and corporation’s aggregate tax burden depends 
on events unknown at the time the election must be filed.  For 
example, the pros and cons of making the election depend on 
when the corporation sells the asset, when the shareholder 
sells the stock, and the amount of future income earned by 
the shareholder and the corporation.  Thus, the election 
under § 362(e)(2)(C) is a forward-looking election, and, as long 
as the corporation is owned by more than one shareholder, 
the election affects taxpayers whose interests diverge.250 
 
the exemption.  Assume the amount of the exemption is $3700.  The aggregate 
reduction in taxes (in other words, the amount by which the parents’ total taxes 
would have been lower if NCP had claimed the exemption rather than CP) is 
$3700 x 25% - $3700 x 15% = $925 - $555 = $370.  The $370 could be refunded 
entirely to CP.  Fourth, replacing the current rules with a mandatory rule under 
which only the custodial parent can take the exemption would both protect 
custodial parents and make it so that an unsophisticated couple who did not use 
the election advantageously was not disadvantaged compared to a sophisticated 
couple. 
 247. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.  
 248. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra Part I.E. 
 250. The shareholder who contributes the property may benefit more, 
individually, from a higher stock basis, while the other shareholders would 
benefit more, individually, if the corporation had a higher basis in the asset.  
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Given the forward-looking nature of the election, 
applying a tailored default rule would be costly and difficult.  
Applying such a default rule would require the IRS to 
determine, as of the election’s due date, what the taxpayers 
expected regarding the future income of the shareholder and 
corporation and other future events. 
Therefore, it is advisable to use an untailored default rule 
that minimizes the shareholder’s and corporation’s aggregate 
tax liability in the majority of cases.  Without empirical 
evidence, it is not entirely clear whether such a rule would 
preserve the built-in loss at the corporate level or shareholder 
level.  However, it is plausible that an untailored default rule 
would preserve the loss at the corporate level (the opposite of 
the current default rule).  Stated another way, in many (and 
perhaps most) cases, the corporation would obtain more of a 
tax benefit from a higher basis in the asset than the tax 
benefit the shareholder would obtain from a higher basis in 
the stock.251 
If the default rule is reversed so that the corporation 
obtains the higher basis instead of the contributing 
shareholder, it may be desirable to ensure that the 
contributing shareholder receives a significant portion of the 
economic benefit of the tax losses and deductions taken by the 
corporation, given that the economic loss in the contributed 
property accrued while held by the shareholder.  If more than 
one shareholder own the corporation, tax losses taken by the 
corporation may benefit all shareholders (not just the 
contributing shareholder).  In order to achieve the goal of 
providing more benefit to the contributing shareholder, the 
election could be designed to give the contributing 
shareholder the unilateral right to opt out of the default 
treatment.  By providing notice to the corporation before the 
due date of the shareholder’s first tax return following the 
 
Thus, if the corporation has more than one owner, the interest of the 
contributing shareholder diverges from the interests of the noncontributing 
shareholders.  If the corporation has only one owner, the election affects 
taxpayers whose interests are aligned; specifically, it affects the contributing 
shareholder and the corporation that is wholly owned by that contributing 
shareholder. 
 251. This is especially likely to be the case if the asset is depreciable by the 
corporation so that a higher tax basis entitles the corporation to greater 
depreciation deductions. 
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property contribution and by including a copy of this notice 
with his or her tax return, the shareholder could opt to retain 
a higher basis in the stock and require the corporation to take 
a lower basis in the asset.  The shareholder could make this 
election unless the parties explicitly agreed otherwise.  If the 
parties determine that a higher corporate level basis would 
minimize aggregate tax liability, other shareholders in the 
corporation could provide an economic benefit to the 
contributing shareholder in exchange for his or her 
agreement to not elect out of the default treatment.  Finally, 
to ensure that the contributing shareholder is aware of the 
election, tax return forms could provide relevant information 
as described in the next section. 
B. Informing Taxpayers of an Election 
As discussed in the preceding section, designing favorable 
default rules can mitigate a tax election’s bias against 
unsophisticated taxpayers.  In addition, as discussed in this 
part, including further information about available elections 
in tax return forms could assist unsophisticated taxpayers.252  
While this information could cause tax revenue loss if 
unsophisticated taxpayers make more informed election 
decisions, concerns about fairness should outweigh 
considerations of tax revenue given that additional revenue 
would be forgone merely as a result of trapping fewer unwary 
taxpayers. 
Lengthy descriptions of all available elections would 
undoubtedly overwhelm taxpayers and remain unread.  
However, technological developments offer a potential 
solution to this problem.  In particular, tax return 
preparation software (including free IRS provided programs) 
could (and in some cases already does) ask preliminary 
questions and, based on the answers provided, only display 
information that may be relevant.253  For example, the tax 
preparation software would only display information about 
the election related to alimony if a taxpayer answered yes to a 
 
 252. See Maguire & Zimet, supra note 13, at 1288. 
 253. For example, at least one tax return preparation programs asks if the 
taxpayer owned a home at any time during the year, and, if the taxpayer 
answers affirmatively, the program prompts the taxpayer to provide 
information relevant to the tax treatment of homeowners. 
CAUBLE FINAL 7/23/2013  9:23 PM 
480 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
preliminary inquiry regarding whether he or she had been 
divorced. 
Finally, providing additional information to taxpayers is 
most effective for elections that are due at the same time as 
tax returns because the information can be contained on 
return forms and in return preparation software.  If an 
election is due prior to a return, the IRS’s options for alerting 
taxpayers to the election are limited.  Material on the IRS 
website could describe the election, but, if taxpayers do not 
know an election exists, they will have no reason to search for 
information about it.  Thus, the recommendation to inform 
taxpayers is unavoidably linked to the recommendation that 
elections should be due at the same time as a tax return, as 
discussed in the next section. 
C. Election Deadlines 
Regarding timing, later filing deadlines would promote 
fairness because more unsophisticated taxpayers could 
discover that an election exists.254  Particularly for elections 
that are currently due before the taxpayer’s return, delaying 
the deadline until the return’s due date could reduce bias 
against unsophisticated taxpayers for two reasons.  First, 
even an unsophisticated taxpayer who is ignorant of an 
election’s existence will likely be aware of the obligation to 
file a return and, in the context of seeking assistance with 
return preparation, the taxpayer would be more likely to 
learn about and obtain advice regarding an election.255  
Second, establishing the return filing deadline as the due 
date for an election would make it possible to include 
information about the election on return forms and in return 
preparation software in order to enlighten unsophisticated 
taxpayers.  In the case of most elections, the due date already 
coincides with the deadline for filing returns.256  However, 
this is not the case for all elections.  For example, the entity 
classification election often must be filed before the due date 
for the entity’s first tax return.257 
 
 254. See Lyon, supra note 201, at 594. 
 255. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 256. See, e.g., Helvey & Stetson, supra note 13, at 338. 
 257. See supra Part I.D.  It is not clear why the entity classification is due 
when it is.  When the Treasury proposed the current regulations, some 
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While later filing deadlines promote fairness, they also 
result in additional lost tax revenue.  Moreover, unlike 
adopting favorable default rules and providing taxpayers with 
additional information, delayed filing deadlines would cause 
reduced tax revenue not merely because unsophisticated 
taxpayers made more favorable elections.  Rather, delayed 
filing deadlines for forward-looking elections could also cause 
revenue loss because sophisticated taxpayers would make 
more favorable elections at a time when they possess more 
information that bears on the pros and cons of a given 
election.  To use the entity classification election as an 
example, a given classification’s advantages and 
disadvantages depend, in part, on the economic results 
realized by the entity.258  If regulations granted taxpayers 
more time to make a decision regarding entity classification, 
taxpayers would possess greater information about the 
economic results of the entity, and they would be able to 
make election decisions that more effectively reduce tax 
liability.  In other words, more time would not simply allow 
unsophisticated taxpayers to correct their mistakes regarding 
tax law but also allow sophisticated taxpayers to correct 
decisions based upon mistaken predictions.259  Consequently, 
 
commentators suggested that taxpayers should be allowed to make 
classification elections with their first tax returns.  The Treasury did not heed 
this recommendation and, regarding its reason for dismissing the 
recommendation, stated simply, “Treasury and the IRS continue to believe that 
it is appropriate to determine an entity’s classification at the time that it begins 
its operations.”  See 61 Fed. Reg. 66584, 66586. (1996).  It may be that the 
Treasury spurned a later deadline because of the increased tax planning 
opportunities it would create.  See infra notes 258 and accompanying text.  The 
election under § 83(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides another example of 
an election with an early deadline.  This election determines the tax treatment 
of certain transfers of property made to service providers and must be filed no 
later than thirty days after property is transferred.  I.R.C. § 83(b)(2) (2012).  A 
later filing deadline for this election may not be feasible because it would 
provide taxpayers with too great of an opportunity to make tax revenue-
reducing elections.  If this is the case, serious consideration ought to be given to 
replacing the election with mandatory treatment. 
 258. See supra Part I.D. 
 259. The revised deadline would provide that the initial classification election 
was not due until the entity filed its first tax return.  Any subsequent changes 
to elections could still be due within seventy-five days of their effective dates.  
The revenue effect of this change might not be particularly large.  Even if the 
due date is delayed until the tax return date, the taxpayer only possesses 
information about the entity’s operations for a little more than its first year.  
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a balanced approach to filing deadlines may be warranted.  
One way to adopt a balanced approach would involve delaying 
the deadline for an election until the due date for filing a tax 
return while, at the same time, increasing the persistence of 
the election, as discussed in Part IV.D. below.260 
Another way to institute a balanced approach would 
combine early filing deadlines with more readily available 
relief for unsophisticated taxpayers to file late elections.  As 
discussed above,261 a taxpayer is unlikely to obtain permission 
to file a late election unless he or she evaluated the election 
prior to its original deadline and always intended to make a 
given election.  These current rules offer little or no 
assistance to unsophisticated taxpayers who, prior to an 
election’s deadline, may have had no intention with respect to 
the election whatsoever. 
The current rules do serve a practical purpose by helping 
to ensure that taxpayers do not use information obtained 
since an election’s deadline to make a more favorable election 
than what they would have made based on information 
available as of the original deadline.  To prevent a taxpayer 
from using hindsight in this manner, a court or the IRS must 
determine what election the taxpayer would have made based 
only on information available as of the election’s due date.  
This task is fairly straightforward if the taxpayer can 
demonstrate that, prior to the election’s deadline, he or she 
clearly revealed an intention to elect the same tax treatment 
that he or she now seeks to elect.  For example, the taxpayer 
could present memoranda from advisors stating that the 
 
The election would still have a significant forward-looking component.  In other 
words, the pros and cons of making the election would still depend on the 
results of the business in future years which will be unknown by the taxpayer 
at the time the election is made.  Nevertheless, some tax revenue may be 
relinquished, and the tax revenue forgone is not merely a consequence of 
mitigating the bias against unsophisticated taxpayers but also results from 
expanding tax planning opportunities available to sophisticated taxpayers. 
 260. Increasing persistence is not always a viable option because some 
elections are irrevocable and thus, already persist indefinitely.  The § 83(b) 
election discussed above is an example of an election that is irrevocable in most 
circumstances.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(f) (2012) (regarding revocability of the 
election), and see supra note 257 for further discussion of this election.  For 
elections with early deadlines that already persist indefinitely, policymakers 
ought to consider the possibility of replacing the election with mandatory 
treatment. 
 261. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
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election should be made, and the taxpayer could explain that 
a miscommunication regarding who would file the paperwork 
was the only reason the election was not timely filed.  By 
contrast, if a taxpayer did not even consider an election prior 
to its deadline, the court or the IRS would need to examine 
information available as of the election’s original due date to 
attempt to determine what the taxpayer would have wanted 
if he or she had considered the election.  For the entity 
classification election, for instance, courts or the IRS would 
consider evidence bearing on the taxpayer’s likely predictions, 
as of the election’s due date, regarding the future profitability 
of the business.  The court or the IRS would then decide, 
based on this information, what election an informed 
taxpayer would have made.  Completing this task would be 
challenging for the same reasons that applying a tailored 
default rule to a forward-looking tax election is difficult.262  
Both exercises require the court or the IRS to place itself in 
the position of the taxpayer as of an earlier date and decide 
what a more sophisticated taxpayer would have elected. 
Nevertheless, the task of providing late filing relief to 
unsophisticated taxpayers will not always be insurmountable, 
and, when it is feasible to provide relief, courts or the IRS 
should not hesitate to do so.  In some cases involving forward-
looking elections, a taxpayer could prove that he or she would 
have made a different election based on information available 
as of the election’s due date, and he or she failed to do so only 
as a result of a lack of understanding of the election’s tax 
consequences.263  A flexible doctrine could allow courts or the 
IRS to provide relief when taxpayers are able to meet this 
burden.264  In addition, applicable rules could be reformed to 
 
 262. See supra Parts IV.A.3.ii, IV.A.3.iv. 
 263. For instance, in some cases, the taxpayer’s lack of sophistication will be 
obvious.  Also, it could be the case that a different election would have always 
been more favorable as long as the taxpayer’s business was expected to be 
profitable and the taxpayer can convincingly show that he or she anticipated 
profits.  If the taxpayer can show that the economic outcome of the business was 
expected, it would be natural to infer that the taxpayer failed to make a 
different election because of misinformation about tax law.  Thus, this taxpayer 
is not attempting to benefit from hindsight because he or she would have made 
a different election had he or she understood the tax consequences. 
 264. The difference between a flexible doctrine that grants relief for late 
filing and a tailored default rule is significant.  In the case of a tailored default 
rule, any time taxpayers failed to make an affirmative election, courts or the 
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more readily grant relief for late filing of backward-looking 
elections.  In the case of backward-looking elections, it will 
often be clear that the taxpayer is not attempting to use 
hindsight because all relevant information was already 
available as of the election’s original due date.  For example, 
assume the default rule for the dependency exemption 
remains what it is currently so that, by default, the custodial 
parent claims the exemption.265  Further, assume that, in the 
year 2012, a noncustodial parent was in a higher tax bracket 
than a custodial parent so that the divorced couple could save 
taxes if they opted out of the default rule.  The couple is 
unsophisticated and does not adequately consider the election 
before filing their tax returns for 2012.  Sometime later, they 
discover the availability of the election and seek relief to 
amend their 2012 returns to opt out of default treatment.  
The couple would be able to convincingly show that opting out 
of the default rule was the most beneficial choice based only 
on information available at the time the original returns were 
filed.  Therefore, existing rules could be reformed to more 
readily grant relief in such a situation.  For administrative 
reasons, some time limit should be placed on taxpayers’ 
ability to change backward-looking elections.  Similar to the 
current rules for the standard deduction, taxpayers could be 
allowed to change backward-looking tax elections on amended 
returns filed within the period of the statute of limitations for 
claiming a tax refund.266  To address any concerns about 
increased administrative costs, the IRS could charge a fee for 
 
IRS would need to determine what treatment would have appeared favorable 
based on information available as of the original due date for the election.  With 
a flexible doctrine, on the other hand, courts or the IRS only need to answer this 
question in cases in which taxpayers can present evidence that convinces the 
court or the IRS that a given tax treatment clearly would have appeared 
favorable based on information available as of the election’s original due date. 
 265. For further discussion of this election, see supra Part I.C.  If the current 
default rule were replaced with a tailored default rule, as proposed above in 
Part IV.A.3.iii, the taxpayers in the example discussed in the text above would 
have filed returns incorrectly.  Under a tailored default rule, if the parties do 
not consider the election and do not take steps to opt out of default treatment, 
the noncustodial parent would be entitled to claim the exemption in this 
example.  If, as in the example above, the parties file returns in a manner that 
is not consistent with this treatment, they should be able to file amended 
returns to correct their error. 
 266. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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changing elections in an amended return.267  This method for 
addressing cost concerns is less severe than a complete loss of 
ability to make a favorable election. 
D. Persistence of Elections 
As discussed in the preceding section, delaying the filing 
deadlines for elections can reduce bias against 
unsophisticated taxpayers.  However, delaying deadlines also 
leads to lost tax revenue.  Furthermore, at least in the context 
of forward-looking elections, some additional revenue is 
relinquished because sophisticated taxpayers engage in more 
effective tax planning.  Thus, with respect to timing of 
elections, a balanced approach is appropriate and could be 
implemented by delaying the deadline for an election until 
the due date for filing a tax return while, at the same time, 
increasing the persistence of the election.  This can be 
demonstrated in the context of the entity classification 
election. 
Regarding persistence, under current law, entity 
classification elections can be changed every five years.268  
Furthermore, if an entity is initially classified by default, 
there is no limit on how soon it could make a first change to 
its classification.269  Also, if an entity files an election that is 
effective as of the date the entity was formed (an initial 
classification election), there is no restriction on how soon the 
entity could elect to make a first change to its classification.270 
Sophisticated taxpayers can take advantage of this 
flexibility to classify an entity differently during different 
periods of time in order to obtain the most advantageous 
possible tax consequences.  For example, assume a group of 
tax-exempt entities plan to invest in a real estate fund that 
intends to buy and sell for-sale housing (such as 
condominiums) in the United States.  The tax-exempt entities 
anticipate that the fund will generate tax losses in early years 
 
 267. See Lyon, supra note 201, at 594.  This would not be unprecedented.  
Under current law, for example, taxpayers are charged filing fees when they 
submit requests for private letter rulings.  These fees pass administrative costs 
onto taxpayers. 
 268. See supra Part I.D. 
 269. See supra Part I.D. 
 270. See supra Part I.D. 
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as it ramps up its business.  After an initial period of 
generating losses, the fund is expected to generate tax gains.  
If these expectations are realized, the tax-exempt entities will 
obtain the most beneficial tax treatment by investing through 
an entity that is treated as a partnership in early years.271  In 
later years when the business is producing tax gains, the tax-
exempt entities could obtain more advantageous tax 
treatment by investing through an entity treated as a 
corporation and funded, in part, with debt.272  Consequently, 
assuming the tax-exempt entities invest through an entity 
that is treated as a partnership by default, the tax-exempt 
entities will initially refrain from filing a classification 
election so that they may benefit from partnership treatment 
in early years.  A couple years later, the tax-exempt entities 
will file an election to treat the entity as a corporation going 
forward.  The five-year limitation will not preclude the tax-
exempt entities from changing the classification of the entity 
because the entity’s original default classification did not 
trigger the five-year limitation. 
 
 
 271. If the entity is treated as a partnership in the loss years, each tax-
exempt entity will be allocated its share of unrelated business losses generated 
by the partnership.  Each tax-exempt entity can deduct the resulting losses 
against other unrelated business taxable income, subject to certain limitations.  
I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(a) (2012).  By contrast, if the 
entity were treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, losses that it 
recognized would not flow through to the tax-exempt entities. 
 272. In years in which the fund generates gains, if the tax-exempt entities 
invested through a partnership, they would be subject to tax at thirty-five 
percent on all gains from sale of housing by the fund because such gains would 
constitute income subject to the UBIT.  For further discussion, see supra note 
87.  By contrast, if the tax-exempt entities invest through a U.S. entity treated 
as a corporation and funded in part with debt, the tax-exempt entities will earn 
income that is characterized as dividend income, capital gain income, and 
interest income.  The tax-exempt entities will generally not be subject to tax on 
this income.  For further discussion, see supra note 88.  This result should not 
be affected by § 512(b)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code (a provision that 
subjects tax-exempt entities to tax on interest paid by certain controlled 
entities) as long as no tax-exempt entity’s interest in the corporation is more 
than fifty-percent.  Furthermore, while the U.S. entity treated as a corporation 
is subject to entity-level tax generally at a rate of thirty-five percent, this 
entity’s taxable income is reduced by interest expenses paid on its debt 
financing, subject to certain limitations.  See I.R.C. §§ 11, 163(a), 163(j).  Thus, 
the aggregate tax liability of the fund and the tax-exempt entities can be 
reduced by treating the fund as a corporation and financing the fund, in part, 
with debt. 
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The persistence of the classification election would 
increase if the five-year time period were lengthened or if 
classifications by default and initial classification elections 
started the five-year (or greater) time period during which 
classification elections were disallowed.  If lawmakers 
instituted these changes, taxpayers likely would attempt to 
plan around the new restrictions.  In particular, taxpayers 
would enter into actual transactions that replicate the tax 
consequences that follow from an elective change to an 
entity’s classification.  In the context of the real estate fund 
described in the preceding paragraph, for instance, the tax-
exempt entities could, as above, refrain from filing an election 
so that the entity is treated as a partnership for the first two 
years.  If default classification triggered the five-year (or 
greater) limitation, the tax-exempt entities could not 
electively change the classification of the existing 
partnership.  However, they could cause the partnership to: 
(i) contribute all of its assets to a newly formed entity treated 
as a corporation for tax purposes and (ii) distribute the stock 
in the new corporation to the tax-exempt entities in 
liquidation of the partnership.  The tax-exempt entities could 
claim that these transactions resulted in the same tax 
consequences as an elective change to the entity’s 
classification.273  Thus, for the suggested reform to have any 
 
 273. If the tax-exempt entities elect to change the fund’s classification from 
partnership to corporation, the parties will be treated as if: (i) first, the 
partnership contributed all of its assets and liabilities to a newly formed 
corporation in exchange for stock in the corporation and, (ii) second, the 
partnership liquidated by distributing stock in the corporation to the tax-
exempt entities.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1).  As a result of these deemed 
transactions, the parties generally should not recognize any gain or loss.  I.R.C. 
§§ 351, 731 (providing for non-recognition on the deemed contribution of assets 
to the corporation and providing generally for non-recognition on the deemed 
distribution of stock by the partnership, respectively).  Likewise, similar 
treatment should follow if: (i) the partnership actually contributed all of its 
assets to a newly formed corporation, and (ii) the partnership subsequently 
liquidated by distributing stock in the corporation to the tax-exempt entities.  
At the time of step (i), the partnership likely holds assets with built-in gains.  
However, generally, the partnership should not recognize these gains.  Id. § 351.  
This is true at least as long as the IRS does not successfully argue that the 
transaction lacks a business purpose and should be ineligible for non-
recognition treatment under § 351.  Likewise, when the partnership distributes 
stock in the corporation to the tax-exempt entities, the partnership and the tax-
exempt entities generally should not recognize gain or loss.  Id. § 731.  
Alternatively, the IRS might challenge the claimed results of these transactions 
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real impact, other measures would have to supplement the 
increased persistence.  These measures would prevent 
taxpayers from easily circumventing the restrictions on 
elective changes.274 
If a later deadline was adopted in tandem with increased 
persistence, sophisticated taxpayers would benefit from some 
additional information when making the original 
classification decision.  In particular, taxpayers would be 
aware of the results of the entity’s operations from the time it 
was formed until the due date for filing the first tax return.  
However, taxpayers would have less ability to revise entity 
classification in the future in response to changed economic 
circumstances.  The increased persistence, thus, leads to 
additional tax revenue collection that, at least partially, 
offsets any tax revenue lost as a result of later filing 
deadlines. 
Finally, increased persistence could, at the same time, 
aggravate the bias against unsophisticated taxpayers.  If such 
taxpayers fail to make a beneficial classification decision at 
the outset, they will be burdened by the negative 
consequences for a longer period of time.275  For this reason, a 
rule providing for increased persistence might be adopted in 
combination with rules allowing taxpayers more leeway to 
revoke or revise tax elections that were mistaken from the 
outset.  Such rules would mirror the provisions for late filing 
relief discussed above.276 
 
 
by asserting that the new entity should be treated as a mere continuation of the 
old entity for tax purposes.  
 274. For example, courts could apply a stronger business purpose 
requirement when determining whether property contributions receive non-
recognition treatment under § 351.  As a result, when the partnership 
contributed its assets to a newly formed corporation as an attempt to plan 
around the five-year rule, the partnership likely would be required to recognize 
any built-in gains in its assets.  Thus, the tax-exempt entities would recognize 
significant income subject to the UBIT when the assets were contributed to the 
corporation.  To avoid this result, the parties likely would treat the fund as a 
corporation from the outset (and, as a result, forgo the tax savings resulting 
from treating the fund as a partnership in its early, loss-generating years). 
 275. See Lyon, supra note 201, at 594. 
 276. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Tax elections are harmful.  They cause tax revenue 
erosion, unfairness, and complexity.  Despite their numerous 
flaws, elections are, and likely will continue to be, prominent 
features of tax law.  Given the ubiquitous nature of tax 
elections, their parameters should be carefully crafted so as to 
mitigate the damage that they cause.  This Article 
recommends a number of measures that could moderate the 
negative consequences of elections.  First, default rules 
should be taxpayer favorable.  Second, steps should be taken 
to alert taxpayers to available elections.  Third, if at all 
possible, elections should not be due until a taxpayer is 
required to file a tax return, and, in some cases, 
unsophisticated taxpayers should be more freely allowed to 
file late elections.  Finally, in some cases it might be 
advisable to increase the persistence of elections while, at the 
same time, more readily grant relief to unsophisticated 
taxpayers who can show that a given election was ill-advised 
from the start. 
Many of these recommendations will promote fairness 
but, at the same time, lead to additional tax revenue loss.  
However, at least when additional tax revenue is surrendered 
merely as a result of trapping fewer unwary taxpayers, 
fairness ought to be prioritized because lost tax revenue can 
be recouped in fairer ways.  If relinquishing the additional 
tax revenue is untenable, serious consideration should be 
given to eliminating an election entirely and mandating the 
less favorable treatment for everyone rather than continuing 
to impose the less favorable treatment on only the ill-
informed. 
 
